PLANNING FOR FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN CHRONIC CONFLICT ZONES BETWEEN TEMPORARY CAMPS AND PERMANENT SETTLEMENTS?

THE CASE OF KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

RESEARCH PROJECT ON LAND GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB REGION

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ABBREVIATIONS

BRHA	Board of Relief and Humanitarian Affairs
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CIREFCA	International Conference on Central American Refugees
GSC	Global Shelter Cluster
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICARA	International Confederation of Alcohol, Tobacco and other Drug Research Associations
iDMC	Internal Displacement monitoring Centre
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFFP	Oil-for-Food Programme
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
PWJ	Peace Winds Japan
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SRP	Settlement Rehabilitation Programme
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nation Children's Fund
UNOHCI	United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USCRI	U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrant
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the shadows of armed conflicts and forced displacements, the urban landscape is subjected to constant changes and fragilities due to their direct and indirect impacts. In the past decade, chronic conflicts have raged in many countries of the Global South, stories of violent displacement from Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Syria and Yemen still resurface in the mainstream media: the lack of adequate shelters, the dire human conditions, the absences of livelihoods opportunities and heavy aid-dependencies. Beyond the destruction, uprooting and homelessness, these stories keep reaffirming the aftermath and consequences of chronic instability: the persistence of inhabitability in the countries of origin and their temporary spaces of waiting.

The lives of forcibly displaced persons emerge in parallel spatial dimensions within and outside the existing ones, changing rapidly and dramatically the built environments in terms of physical settings and meaning. The humanitarian displacement camps and settlements are examples of such parallel dimensions. Using these paradigms to mitigate and overcome fragile situations is not new, traced historically to the earliest cities of refuges, post-war humanitarian responses and reconstructions of urban lives. These concepts linked humanitarian response to development, stability and peace. However, since the Second World War, the changes in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP), from victims of circumstances into a temporary (political) presence, have dramatically impacted the forcibly displaced built environment set anew. Camp and settlement schemes in the 1960s and 1970s responded to prolonged displacement acknowledged the need to stabilize the temporariness through spatial paradigms that support socioeconomic growth and the hosts. However, with the ever-shifting political climates, towards the forcibly displaced as well as mistrust and fear of shifting burdens resulted in the reduction of such models into mere grids, reverting to conditional temporariness and shying away for any promises of permanency.

Since 2011, to accommodate millions of the forcibly displaced from the Syrian conflict and the rise and fall of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), camps and settlements mushroomed within and across borders of nation States: regions with relative stability acted as safe havens and humanitarian hosts for the massively displaced. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq, with more than 40 humanitarian displacement camps for refugees and the internally displaced, is definitely one of these regions.

In Kurdistan Region, the international humanitarian regime, in coordination with the Kurdish Regional Government, used a hybrid form of camps and settlements to accommodate and control the massive influxes. This strategy has proven effective in the emergency response: a modular grid serves sheltering, protection and humanitarian services, basic infrastructure with a room for designated areas acting as parallel urban structures, such as administration, schools, primary health centres. For almost a decade now, these "temporary" settlements have been containing hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs waiting for a "solution to come" in an undefined tomorrow.

The presence of camps and settlements for this particular purpose can be traced decades back in Kurdistan. This region represents an example of the resurgence of armed conflict and such waves of forced displacement, with the use of settlements set anew as arrival infrastructures with different rationales. Conceiving standardized camps and settlements has been convenient in optimizing care and control operations in the emergency response. However, their present and future scenarios have relied on the historical context of their construction and the blessing of the top-down authority. In the past three decades, many humanitarian and development projects for these sites have aimed at achieving self-reliance, resilience and sustainability. However, with the inconsistencies of time-space relative stabilities, changing actors and reductions in funding, these aims are far out of reach. These inconsistencies are generating irrevocable ecological implications, financial and natural resources exhaustion, which applies to the contemporary forced displacement receiving sites.

In the absence of a continuous nurturing milieu in chronic conflict zones, humanitarian response cannot overlook the physical condition of people in need. Neglecting these frequent interruptions hinders aspirations of sustainability and well-being, whereas the expectations of self-sufficiency are hardly realistic. Equally, seeding camps and settlements in such crippling situations will only produce unfinished urban forms and human conditions in endless need of a "boost". It is paramount to rethink displacement planned sites – especially in such chronic conflict zones – not only as a quick fix of reappearing phenomena but also their long-term impact on natural resources, host communities and hosted ones.

In the current academic and policy debates,

a paradigm shift occurs, promoting circularity as an overarching canopy that aims to achieve sustainability and keep the system operating in, if achieved, a healthy manner. Circularity, as an approach to "rethink from the ground" (OECD, 2020), has been portrayed as a practical corrective move by promising to make amends to "overcome the contradiction between economic and environmental prosperity" (Pomponi and Moncaster, 2017). Thinking of new camps and settlements as loci of infrastructure and concentration of humanitarian aid can present an opportunity to tailor such understandings of circularity. The optimized design, scale, and partial or complete isolation of these sites can be seen as an opportunity to apply

such "systematic shift" thinking to close loops of consumption, generate livelihood opportunities and activate the recovery process.

More focused research is required to understand the role of camps and settlements within chronic conflict situations and feed the existing intellectual and practice debates on possibilities within limitations. The need is to grasp the reality of the ways in which emergency and relative stabilities structure a modified time-space, and fragmented existences materialized. Building on that, embrace the role of the camp and settlement to bring these patches together and stretch to become self-sustaining, dependent upon and enablers of the healing processes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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1.1. Research Rationale

Since 2011, the Middle East and North Africa has been the world's most notable region of political upheavals and sequential instabilities. This situation has been generating unprecedented waves of forced displacements and exuberating multilayered crises, overspilling within and across State political borders. In this "decade of displacement", according to the Global Report on Internal Displacements 2021 (iDMC, 2021), durable solutions are far out of reach, with the 12.5 million people displaced in critical situations along with the destruction of IDPs' former habitat that remain inhabitable and insecure (iDMC, 2021). Many forced displacement arrival sites are born out of such destruction of the tangible and intangible relations embedded in the built environment.

Humanitarian camps and settlements represent the most common arrival sites for the displaced. They are the spatial apparatuses "layered and ordered by diverse objects and programmes" (Hailey, 2009) to respond temporarily to emergencies and manage prolonged waves of displacement. However, with the chronic nature of conflicts, insecurities and chronic vulnerabilities in such heated zones, and the former habitus level of destruction, the displacement becomes protracted. Thus, these humanitarian sites become "a home" for the displaced with an expectancy of a lifespan exceeding the expected 18–26 years (Grafham and Lahn, 2018; Loescher and Milner, 2005; UNHCR, 2016a).

The prolonged reality of these arrival sites, the protraction of displacement and the inability to go back or rebuild quickly have renewed the call to link relief with rehabilitation and development responses. Labelled as a disaster-development continuum, a transition between relief and development (Audet, 2015), and recently a humanitarian-development-peace nexus, aligning their goals with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) where "no one is left behind" is needed. These shifts are adding and refining components of self-reliance, durability and socioeconomic resilience. This resurrection reflects spatially in one of the alternatives to camp solutions: the substitution of the temporary camp with the settlement approach to be integrated within the host. (UNHCR, 2016b, 2018, 2021a).

However, the impact of such approaches swinging between aid and development operations while the physical components (the camp and settlement, the shelter, infrastructure) built as a quick emergency response is still lagging, and physical intervention is mainly related to correction measures, greenwashing and upgrading. All these interventions are based on assigned budgets, donor agendas and the political climate. Therefore, international and local agencies have been struggling to transition between humanitarian and development related to the humanitarian camp's particularity. These struggles are apparent in the physical and lived realities in camps: unfinished, lacking clear time-space frames and uncalculated multidimensional impacts on the hosts. Undeniably, the dominance of the chronic crisis-ridden conditions and host's fragility that camp-settlement root-in create sequential crippled urbanization processes in an endless need for a boost.

Therefore, there is a mismatch between temporary humanitarian camps and settlements as emergency response, and the need to depend on the fragile host infrastructure of countries experiencing chronic conflict and the succession of crises. The existing linear frameworks to smooth the humanitarian-development peace transitions do not fully account for the resurgence of locally embedded emergencies. They fail largely to absorb the shocks resulting and causing the resurgence of different crises (economic, health, violence, armed struggles, famine), with chronic vulnerabilities added to ever-latent struggles of host communities. This mismatch has, so far, led to depletion of resources, infrastructural fatigue, environmental degradation, rising hostilities between host and displaced persons, and deepen aid addiction.

In such contested contexts, serious reconsiderations are required to recapture the meaning of the role of "planning for forced displacement" beyond its humanitarian and temporary nature and the linearity of relief development. It is essential to account for the host's instability and fragility, incorporating how the new settlement functions beyond its operational programming can support the displaced, the host environment and host communities. Furthermore, there is need to develope ideas to identify different spatial design scenarios for the physical space leading to self-sustaining settlements becoming dependent upon to trigger a healthier recovery for the host.

1.2. Research Questions

In order to understand the role of planning for forced displacement in chronic conflict zones and develop a more elaborate framework for spatial interventions, the research takes the Kurdistan Region

of Iraq[1] as a case study. The focus is on using camps and settlements to manage and control waves of displacement since the decolonization of Iraq and the autonomy agreement in 1970.[2] In the selected period, the short intervals between conflicts and stability, waves of displaced persons and the continuous presence of aid-development actors have been continuously shaping the region's urban landscapes. The main question of this research is: What are the spatial roles and impacts of using "Camps" and "Settlement" to absorb and manage forced displacement waves in chronic conflict zones such as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq?

To comprehend the complexities of forced displacement urbanism within such geopolitical context, the focus is on three spatial frames: 1) the site as designed; 2) the site as constructed and conceived; and 3) the site appropriated by different users. Hence to answer such complex questions within these spatial frames, the research focuses on the following subquestions:

- How do we define emergency and chronic conflict zones? Moreover, what is the relation between the camp and settlement set anew as an arrival infra-structure in such contexts?

- What is the logic behind developing and using the camp and settlement for emergency and protracted refugee responses?

- What are the components of the designed site?

- What are the spatial and situational particularities of these arrival infrastructures used historically in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to absorb forced displace-ment waves?

- What are the current situation and future scenarios of these settlements?

- What are the current problems and potential con-cepts to address sustainability and self-reliance in similar contexts?

1.3. Research Methodology

This research used a mixed-methods approach to answer the research questions and understand the relations between chronic conflict and the temporary camp and settlement as a designed, constructed, lived space, and identify patterns and lessons learnt to inform and investigate solutions through further research. The findings draw upon data previously collected by the author to complete her PhD titled From Camp to Town: Refugee Camps as Urban Seeds: The Case of Refugee Camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

The collected data illuminate different aspects of the settlement set anew, as arrival infrastructure, and the time-space experience for different users. For purposes of this study – which is to understand the present situation and future scenarios for humanitarian camps and settlements in the context of the Iraqi Kurdistan – the focus is on the main following points: 1) the site as designed; 2) the site as constructed and conceived; and 3) the site as appropriated by different users.

To understand the first point, the research focuses on the development of the policies and logic dealing with forced displacement waves in chronic conflict zones with multifold crises, and the progression of designing and using the camps and settlements to manage and control in such complex situations.

For the second point, the focus is on the entanglement of the Kurdistan Region's historical narrative as a zone of chronic conflict and using the settlement approach to manage the displaced. Therefore, the research traces this use back to the first autonomy agreement in 1970, reaching the ongoing situation in camps for those displaced by the Syrian conflict and the rise and fall of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The historical data is reconstructed from academic research, policy documents, humanitarian and official reports that are publicly available.

For the third point, the focus is to understand how different users adjust the settlements within the existing limitations: displaced persons, aid workers, government officials and host communities experienced the camp.

1 The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is an autonomous region of the Federal Republic of Iraq. Though the autonomy agreement of the region was signed in 1970 (Harris, 1977), it only became fully effective after the 2005 constitution of Iraq. The region has a State-like status with large authorities of administrative and internal affairs. The region is formed of four governorates: Duhok, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and recently Halabja. The majority of the region's population is of Kurdish background.

2 The 1970A peace accord came after years of armed struggle for self-determination between the Kurdish resistance and the Iraqi army. This agreement became fully effective after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime and the reformed Iraqi constitution of 2005. Article 117 of the constitution specifically recognizes the Kurdistan Region as an integral component of federal Iraq, while the official languages of Iraq are both Arabic and Kurdish in Article 4. The constitution also incorporates general principles of civic, cultural, political rights and religious freedom into the region's governance structure. Political processes and institutions also became more representative to include diverse parties, ethnic and religious groups.

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The author's findings draw upon data collected through fieldwork, used "hanging out" and semi-structured interviews methods (Alexandra, 2017; Creswell, 2007; Jean, 2010). The focus groups were: 1) 30 displaced families living in camps; 2) 20 aid workers and government officials working in humanitarian camps in 2018 and 2019. In addition, there were online interviews during 2020 and 2021 due to travel restrictions triggered by political unrests and lately by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The researcher involved mental health specialists and psychologists in reviewing the questionnaire to make sure it suits the sensitive experience of refugeehood. The interviewees were balanced in age and gender for the refugee group, while aid workers were majority male-dominated. The researcher informed all the interviewees about the research goals and assured the anonymity and confidentiality of their generous participation voluntarily.

In the past decade, the resurgence of refugees and IDP camps and settlements dominated the media. These spatial paradigms are conceived to meet immediate needs and are appropriated for a prolonged make-do. They act as arrival infrastructures to shelter the forcibly displaced (Meeus, Arnaut and van Heur, 2018) and an arena for relief response (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). Their presupposed nature differs: the camp is temporary and the last resort (IOM, NRC, and UNHCR, 2015) while the settlement is to be, potentially, integrated till the (vulnerable) waiting ends (Armstrong, 1990; UNHCR, 2016b). This waiting stretches in time and space until a more suitable and durable solution presents itself: namely repatriation, local integration or resettlement. Nevertheless, cases like Palestinian, Africa south of the Sahara and Sudanese refugee camps and settlements (and many others) are constant reminders of how these waiting settings consolidate in the urban reality, turning into accidental cities in the making (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010; Jansen, 2018). With lifespan exceeding the expected 18–26 years range (Grafham and Lahn, 2018; Loescher and Milner, 2005; UNHCR, 2016a), indeed, the persistence of these settings in space-time and everyday life within them defy "waiting zone" attributes.

Associated with chronic conflict, host fatigue and shrinkage of budgets, the hardly predictable lifespan of these sites and changing political climates towards the occupational group's challenge these sites' essential purposes. This adds critical and hardly reversible socioeconomic, spatial and ecological impacts on the displaced and their hosts. Therefore, the humanitarian problems get entangled with the development one. The persistence of these problems has been fundamental in employing planned camps and settlements in forced displacement. Recently, aid and development agencies (those of the United Nations and their implementation partners) advocated the humanitarian-development-peace nexus to bridge the gaps and shift from mere relief to a sustainable response. By incorporating the nexus within the physicality of camps and settlements, the aspiration is to become compatible with their contexts and, if needed, to root within the surrogate geography and integrate with the host community.

A hybrid of camp and settlement paradigms was the spatial apparatus employed in Kurdistan Region. It acted as a fast deployable solution for multifold displacement waves for Syrian refugees and the Iraqi IDPs (mainly between 2012 and 2015). However, the presence of camps and settlements for this particular purpose can be traced back decades. Kurdistan Region is an example of the resurgence of armed conflict; and such waves of forced displacement, with the use of "settlements", set anew as arrival infrastructures with different rationales. Conceiving standardized camps and settlements has been convenient in optimizing care and control operations in the emergency response. However, their present and future scenarios relied on the historical context of their construction and the blessing of the top-down authority. Many humanitarian and development projects for these sites aimed to march to self-reliance, resilience and sustainability in the past three decades. However, with the inconsistencies of time-space relative stabilities, changing actors and funding curves, these aims are far out of reach. These inconsistencies are generating irrevocable ecological implications as well as the exhaustion of financial and natural resources. Undeniably, these sites and their dwellers drift into a crippling condition.

To rethink the use of planned camps and settlements in chronic conflict zones, this research focuses on the development of planned humanitarian schemes and later their reappearance in Kurdistan to contain and support the forcibly displaced. It aims to read these settings' current status, the advantages, disadvantages between a temporary space and future possibilities of permanency, with plausible scenarios as lived environments. This study also aims to draw attention to the unsustainable spatial practices in such contexts, rising concepts and the potentials these physical settings may present.

3.1. Emergencies and Chronic Conflict

According to Schafer (2002), situations of chronic conflict are characterized by periods of instability that continue post-acute emergencies, occurring consistently as shocks and waves, while the consequences of a severe set of fragilities persist over time (Schafer, 2002). Acute emergencies and chronic conflicts may still coincide with relative stability temporally and geographically territorialized, becoming safe-pockets and sanctuary enclaves. Indeed, in the Syrian and Iraqi cases, many urban and rural sites have been acting, partially, as such. These relatively stable sites attract displaced groups fleeing armed clashes and invite humanitarian assistance for mainly life-saving missions. Many aid agencies, for example, have been partially active in various Syrian stabilized safe-pockets (that is northern parts, Idlib) and Kurdistan, whilst other regions were partially or fully inaccessible due to military operations against ISIS.

Though such presence of humanitarian actors becomes fundamental for the survival of vulnerable groups, the fragile situation of the host territory's existing and destroyed infrastructure and natural resources is under tremendous pressure. Christoplos (2000) accentuates that this fragility may exuberate with environmental and natural hazards and disease outbreaks (lately by COVID-19). Understandably, these arrival infrastructures' short-term relief and inadequacy cannot absorb these sequential sets of shocks and population influxes, lacking adequate time and resources to stabilize or recover. Adding these factors to socioeconomic fragilities, such as poverty and violence, the built environment reflects the "unfinished" and "crippled" nature and living conditions, which the aid funding hardly include.

These complexities invited many humanitarian workers and agencies to advocate to move from aid as a service and an end product, to think in terms of processes and linkages to reduce multifold vulnerabilities and support host communities. The approaches towards working with these linkages, under which the settlement approach falls, have emerged historically in different labels: disaster-development continuum, transition between relief and development, resilience, durable solutions, and more recently with the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. These approaches and concepts aligned themselves with "well-being for all" as a guiding goal: moving beyond total dependency on initial humanitarian interventions and claiming to be sustainable.

3.2. Forced Displacement Planning: Beyond Emergency

3.2.1. Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development: 1914–1960

Between the First and Second World Wars in Europe, many relief agencies worked closely with military troops in refugee situations, used military thinking in managing their budgets and assigning tasks (tactics, fast-deployable, and temporary). This style spatially materialized in the tent and the transitional camp; the camps served as short-time waiting (6–8 months) provisional structures while the resettlement sites were prepared for occupancy (Cuny, 1983). While in the rehabilitation and reconstruction thinking, budgets and tasks (which included refugees) are assigned for socioeconomic and reconstruction needs. This thinking spatially materialized in forms of durable housing and the new settlements focusing on integrated planning, long-term socioeconomic vision, permanent prosperous outcomes, and heavily relied on existing governmental frames and institutions: (Betts et al., 2017).

In the Global South in the 1960s, waves of displaced persons were pouring across national borders to become refugees in newly decolonized nation States. Causes of displacement varied and overlapped with armed conflicts, inter-ethnic disputes, natural disasters, famine and drought[3] (Armstrong, 1990). Many aid and relief agencies had to come to the rescue and fill in, consequently broadening their scope of intervention. At the time, refugees had become a humanitarian issue,[4] temporary for the host and managed from outside under the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate of protection and support.[5] IDPs, however, are supposedly the responsibility of governments. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the IDPs' problems are resolved through collaborative approaches, mainly

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3 Examples are many: partition of India, Nicaragua earthquake, colonial liberation struggles in Africa.

4 Since the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its protocol in 1967; UNHCR, the United Nations refugee agency, is mandated to aid and protect refugees, not including the Palestinian refugees under the UNRWA mandate since 1948.

5 This support is usually with the host State's blessing, either by being a signatory country of the 1951 Convention or through memorandums of understanding between the international humanitarian regime and the hosting State.

with development agencies. Nevertheless, by the late 1960s, with the governmental and institutional vacuum in many States, the UNHCR mandate of a protection umbrella gradually enlarged to include IDPs as "persons of concern".[6]

With an atmosphere of restrictive temporary asylum of refugees in many host countries,[7] waiting months in camps became years (Jacobsen, 2001). Many of these sites were either remotely set, hardly accessible geographically for aid delivery, or close to rural areas thereby potentially becoming rural slums (Black, 1998). Understandably, short-term interventions and the temporary camp survival models failed to meet prolonged needs with the improbabilities of return. Despite the continuity of their efforts in such zones, use of military methods and mere relief have proven ineffective, and in many cases counterproductive (Cuny, 1983). Hence, creating inescapable traps of aid dependencies required a shift in conceptual and practical thinking beyond charity (Cuny, 1983; Loescher, 1993), focusing on camps and settlement models to be well-planned and programmed.

3.2.2. Camps and Settlement Schemes 1960–1985

In principle, UNHCR and host government administrate the camp and the organized settlement set up for refugees. Nevertheless, Jacobsen (2001) differs between both in terms of location, duration and dependency. On the one hand, the camp is an emergency response facility, commonly closer to borders and remote from urban settings, whereas self-sufficiency is not expected. On the other hand, the organized settlement is, ideally, deployed to house refugees and catalyse the development of underutilized regions, hence located closer to rural peripheries. Consequently, the organized settlement poses fewer socioeconomic and security threats (Zetter, 1995), deployed for long-term stay and expected to be self-sufficient pending repatriation of the displaced. In reality, both models' possibility of local integration depends heavily on the goodwill and how the host country perceives the displaced (Jacobsen, 2001).

In the Global South, the earliest spatial paradigm of linking aid for refugees with development was the integrated zonal development projects in the late 1960s in Africa, recast as "refugee aid and development".[8] For rural organized refugee settlements, the goal was to bring the uprooted closer to aid facilities and bring benefits closer to host communities in simultaneously manageable and controllable manner by the local humanitarian regime. Based on its size and population, the settlement itself was subdivided into villages with their centralized services. The layout of the Mishamo refugee settlement in Tanzania represents one of these cases, using "fishbone"[9] roads to reach plots, with possibilities of expansion into the vacant land (see Figures I and II). By inserting new settlements and populations from scratch into national development projects, the ambition was to stimulate development on the periphery (Armstrong, 1991; Betts, 1965; Gorman, 1986).

Around the same period, Fred Cuny, the famous humanitarian practitioner, field-based researcher and former marine, proposed spatial paradigms for the refugee camp. He highlighted the need to shift from military to camps, saying that "the refugee camp is essentially a town and must be planned and constructed under the same design criteria but with greater consideration for the occupants" (Cuny, 1977). Learning from practice and influenced by sites and services schools, he proposed the community as a replicable spatial unit (Kennedy, 2008). The community is also reflected in more diversified spaces for communal gathering, working, public amenities and camp markets. Similar to organized settlement schemes, Cuny imported development logics of self-built models and community mobilization into the layouts, focusing on replicability, decentralization, infrastructural upgrades, and counting for growth or future influxes. More interestingly, his ambitious schemes offered, if implemented correctly, the transition from complete dependency on aid to semi-self-supporting systems that may become fully independent (see Figure III).

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6 This includes refugees, asylum seekers, stateless people, internally displaced people and returnees (UNHCR, 2020b).

7 This relies partly on the reluctance of Western support to resettlement schemes, and the refugees' presence becoming problematic (militarization, conflict spillover, criminal activities), economy (socioeconomic burdens, labour market competition), environmental (pollution, uncontrolled grazing). all created climates of hostility and "social illness".

8 Accordingly, RAD led to two major institutional attempts promoting refugee self-reliance in Africa and Central America, known as ICARA I and II, and CIREFCA in the 1980s. From the early 2000s, self-reliance came to be characterized as a means to overcome protracted displacement situations (Betts et al., 2016).

9 A main road bisecting the settlement from which parallel feeder roads lead away and along where family plots were located.

Figure I: Tanzania - Mishamo refugee settlement layout.
Part of the integrated zonal development.
Source: Armstrong, 1990.

Figure II: Tanzania - Mishamo refugee settlement villages 6 and 10 layouts.
Source: Armstrong, 1990.

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
These relief schemes developed by Cunny's team (called Intertect) have influenced setting emergency camps in Asia and Africa (including the Kurdistan Region in the 1990s). The layouts developed by Intertect appeared in the first edition of the UNHCR Handbook of Emergencies -1982 (see Figure IV).

Figure IV: Refugee camp layouts in the first edition of UNHCR Handbook of Emergencies.
These layouts embrace the community as the standard unit with decentralized services.
Source: Kennedy, 2008.

3.2.3. Humanitarian Camp and Settlement Components

The formerly proposed schemata of camp and settlement models developed by the Cuny and his Intertect team, shows that refugee settlements schemes implemented in the Global South went through dramatic changes in the following decades. However, they are still believed to be the roots of the design manuals today (Kennedy, 2008).

Considering Jacobsen's (2001) differentiation between both cases in terms of location, duration and dependency, the differences are clarified in Table I.

	Camp	Settlement
Hierarchy of spatial components	Shelter – cluster – block – sector – camp	– Housing unit – neighbourhood block – villages – settlement
The replicable unit	(Community (typically 16 plots/families of 6	Village
Duration	Emergency – post emergency – phase out/integrate	(Post emergency – (urban integration
Services	Decentralized communities	Decentralized villages
Location	Closer to borders – (semi) isolated	Peripheries – underdeveloped areas
Livelihood and economic model	Aid to become self-reliant	Support to reach socioeconomic resilience

Table I: Comparison between camp and settlement paradigms.
Source: Author, 2021

In comparing both schemes, the response can be divided into the following components:

3.2.3.1. The Physical Component

This component represents the material structure (including infrastructure and shelter) that the local humanitarian regime provides on-site, the physical intervention from material and non-food items provision to planning, conceiving, and upgrading the site. These physical elements can be shifted and sorted following natural and human-made features. Both schemes advocate for the proximity to existing connections to a host community infrastructure (roads, water, sewage, electricity grid) and urban centres to access economic opportunities, markets and share as well as improve other services with the host (see Figure V).

3.2.3.2. The Soft Component

This component represents the non-material part that makes the physical tick: by programming and managing how physical components should operate and be operated. This component includes building collaborative efforts and supporting the existing (or founding in extreme cases) local bodies to deal with the displacement problem.

3.2.3.3. Users Component

This component represents the human components that run the camps and settlement areas (by working or living). They do so through the physical component's use by implementing the soft component to provide the best service for occupational groups and its actual end use as an end product by the displaced persons themselves. These users can be seen in their relation to the use of the camp and settlement's site: operators and dwellers.

Operators perceive the camp and settlement as a workspace representing institutional, governmental, and humanitarian bodies and their implementing partners. Their camp presence is mission-bound (working hours, short-term missions), hence their spatial structure. This group includes international and national staff and displaced individuals who live in other displacement sites, and whose presence in the camp is only work-related.

Dwellers, in comparison, are the displaced group that arrived at the camp or settlement as a temporary occupational group waiting for a better solution elsewhere. Their presence in the camp is related to accommodation, supposedly undefined, temporary and generally prolonged. The use of camps and settlements as lived spaces include practices of inhabitation and bonding (space-group), gradually moving towards dwelling loci. This group may also work in their camp and settlement, whether at short-term jobs or at local or international organizations, or as entrepreneurs.

3.2.4. Managing the Undesirables 1985–2003

Starting from the mid-1980s, policies pushed promoting repatriation as the favoured durable "solution" with financial packages as incentives to go home (Jacobsen, 2001). Fears of transferring burden instead of sharing it with the more inadequate hosts as hidden losers (Chambers, 1986) accumulated due mostly to the following factors: 1) the absence of firm international commitments towards host governments in the Global South; 2) the withdrawal of humanitarian assistance, 3) the reluctance of resettlement programmes to the Global North; and 4) collapse of many inter-organizational partnerships (Betts et al., 2016).

Consequently, these fears impacted the spatial settings for the uprooted: camps became the last resort and temporary solutions in most manuals and policy documents to manage the undesirables (Agier, 2011). The UNHCR second edition handbook substituted most terminologies relating permanency to temporary, mainly replaced by shelter (Kennedy, 2008). Many projects to upgrade suffered from funding glitches, and physical interventions receded into situational and seasonal improvement (wint erization packages, temporary fixation). All these factors coincided with the dire living conditions of the forcibly displaced, barely to meet their survival needs, and mirrored the push to repatriate.

However, with the unlikelihood of feasible repatriation (Stein, 1986), many practitioners and scholars' voices[10] advocated for the establishment of refugee camps and settlements as part of the long-term national development goals. Davis, Lambert and RedR-1995 (see Figure VI) accentuated that "humanitarian relief programmes, therefore, need to plan for both immediate relief and the promotion of peaceful,

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10 Including Cuny (1983), Stein (1986) and Goethert and Hamdi (1988).

sustainable development". Regarding camp and settlements, the impact was on the soft component, concentrating more on policies and strategies of aid delivery. The newly modified schemes kept Cuny's previous hierarchies of components, yet rarely went beyond the technical orientation (reshuffling and

shifting grided layouts of communities, responding to site features). Though the community spatial unit itself kept its name, it gradually lost the communal' spatial attribute and reversed to tiled plots of former military-operational logic.

Regardless of the attempts to differentiate between

Figure V: Refugee camp layouts alternatives.
Source: Hardin, (1987) in Kennedy (2008)

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
Figure VI: Lamusi Camp Design.
By Davis, Lambert, and RedR (1995).
Source: Kennedy, 2008.

camps as settlements for survival, basic and prolonged needs as well as the ever-changing political realities always had the upper hand. In the earliest version of the novel Sphere, vocabularies relating to livelihood, self-dependencies and reliance became fluid and accompanied by numerical "minimums" of basic needs, highlighting universal applicability (in armed conflict and natural disaster) accentuating voluntary repatriation as the only durable solution.

3.2.5. End of Refugee Warehousing

Severe critiques for the living situations in refugee camps and settlements and their spatial paradigms have remerged regarding the dire inhuman situations within protracted unfinished and crippled forms of urbanity impose on its dwellers (Agier, 2002; Harrell-Bond, 1986; Malkki, 1995). The climate of restrictive possibilities, failure of the majority of integrated settlement projects, and aid-dependent population mentioned earlier; the physicality of the camp model portrayed restrictive rights, insecurity and disempowerment instead of the support (USCRI, 2019).

Various campaigns concerning refugee rights and conditions paved the ground for the 1990s "Refugee Anti-Warehousing" campaign lead by the United States

Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), calling for a wide range of improvements (Smith, 2004; USCRI, 2019). With more than a decade to get the UNHCR endorsement in 2004, these debates lead to the inclusion of the transitional possibilities of refugee camp and settlements, phases of displacement situations focusing on sequential changes, privacy as protection issues, and rethinking refugee camps and settlements in a "durable solution" light.

As regard camp and settlement, the international humanitarian regime toned down the language towards new camps and settlements as the least favoured solution. Since then, the international humanitarian regime has been revisiting old themes[11] for protracted situations, and reproduced different manuals of the UNHCR Handbook of Emergencies, the Sphere book and the Transitional Settlement: Displaced Populations. These manuals highlight camps and relief as a support system, resources location, and focusing on sequential changes with possibilities to durable solutions till the exit phase12 (Corsellis and Vitale, 2004). The design schemes rarely escaped the gridded plans; few variations of community schemes were developed with visual representations in the transitional settlement (see Figure VII)

In the following years, the merging approaches

Figure VII: Transitional settlement for displaced populations, refugee camp scheme.
Source: Corsellis and Vitale, 2004.

labelled: a community-based approach, a neighbourhood approach, area-based approach focused mostly on interventions in existing urban settings, though some of these manuals argue the possible applicability in camp setting. At the same time, alternatives to camps, shelter and settlement strategies and many others have combined the humanitarian-development linkages focusing primarily on programming; all related to upgrades to support protection and self-sufficiency, mostly context-based.

For newly established refugee camps and settlements (see Figure VIII), the spatial durability focused on shelter upgrades, materials responding to weather and time factors focusing on contextual solutions. For example, in the Durable Shelter Catalogue (2014),[11] the cases included shelter models ranging from the basic temporary tents, winterization packages, and building with earth brick and two-room shelters. Many catalogues used by the international humanitarian

regime and their implementation partners, focus on the importance of infrastructural and public facility upgrades, through case studies and practices from the field - mostly contextually tailored to balance between elevating burden and including host communities. The settlement folio (2016) presented several case studies using the masterplan approach for refugee settlements, again highlighting settlements as an alternative solution to camps (UNHCR, 2016b, 2018, 2021a), defying the limitation of movement, services and economic burdens. Similar to earlier endeavours, the settlement folio retained the spatial hierarchy from Cuny's schemes, phasing expansion and building scenarios for integration. Nevertheless, the allocation of the refugee settlements in isolation of the host is still problematic. Combined with the partial restriction of movement, dispersion of the villages and hardly any spatial flows beyond humanitarian assistance keep challenging the main goals of economic resilience, durability and effective integration.

11 Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern with three components: (1) the 4Rs framework (repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation, reconstruction), (2) development assistance for refugees, and (3) development through local integration, with the first focusing on countries of origin and the latter two on self-sufficiency and local integration, respectively, in host countries' phases of contingency, transit, emergency, care and maintenance, durable solutions, then followed by an exit strategies phase of decommissioning the site.

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
Figure VIII: Azraq Refugee Camp in Jordan 2016. Camp, settlement layouts and arial view.
Source: UNHCR, 2016b

3.2.6. Camps are a Last Resort

In the past decade, with the Syria Conflict, ISIS and Yemeni Wars (and recently with the COVID-19 outbreak), scenes from IDP and the situation in the forcibly displaced camps and settlement dominated the mainstream media. Though their role is to contain the succession of flows and rescue the victims, many displayed the paradoxes of care and control: ongoing humanitarian missions, insecurity and illegality in Europe (Moria, Calais), restrictions in Turkey (Öncüpınar), informality in Lebanon (Arsal) and conditioned prosperity in Jordan (Zaatari) and stabilization and homes in Iraq's Kurdistan Region (Domiz Camp). With the resettlement programmes reaching their former percentage in 2020 (UNHCR, 2021b), these sites are becoming the only possible resort. The perplexity of such variation in many locations reflects local humanitarian regime policies towards the occupied group materialized in the limitation of spatial progression and the

geographical locality of this progression, namely: the North and the South.

For the camps in the Global South, reverting to stabilization, shifting back into shelters being foundations of "home" and promoting a well-being future-oriented thinking in the waiting is becoming the dominating policy. These shifts have invited international humanitarian regime to revisit the settlement approach and align its aims with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) where "no one is left behind" through refocusing on the following three fundamental issues: duration, urban integration, and sustainability (GSC, 2020; UNHCR, 2014, 2016b, 2016c). In 2018, the Global Compact on Refugees advocated to balance between easing pressures on the host countries and enhance refugees' self-reliance (United Nations, 2018). The humanitarian-development-peace nexus is the latest resurrection of incorporating this policy as "the transition or [the] overlap between the delivery of humanitarian

assistance and the provision of long-term development assistance" (Strand, 2020).

The recently developed manuals for camp planning and the settlement approach embrace the humanitarian-development-peace nexus as the preferred option. Though camps are still highlighted as the "last resort", because they are well-planned and upgraded these arrival sites do impact the "health, security, privacy and dignity" of its dwellers, in addition providing self-reliance and empowerment. Furthermore, the booklet Site Planning: Guidance to Reduce the Risk of Gender-Based Violence accentuates the design's role in creating safe spaces that respond to changing social norms and increased insecurities that surge in camps. These shifts and changes invited along the way experiments to develop and tailor sustainable solutions in camps. These experiments vary in scale and nature between trial and error depending on the host's political will, funding curves and the camp phase (emergency level and time) (GSC, 2018; UNHCR, 2016b, 2016c, 2018).

Nevertheless, camp design layouts witnessed almost no change. The community unit kept its name and lost its attributes; sustainability became abstracted technical solutions and an end product of high-cost apparatus. In many cases these imported apparatus lack the supporting structures for them to work properly. Self-reliance and empowerment existing opportunities are limited and time-bound; developing a set of skills always faces the lack of accessible and feasible milieu to function. These sites are still stages for humanitarian services, the community participation supports their operative atmosphere, while inconsistent ad hoc interventions fail to fulfil their ambitious purpose of sustainability. The focus of this operative mission in many manuals and the provision of "foundations for homes" act in linearity, thereby

neglecting, to a large extent, the resurgence of crises and shocks. The simplified schematic camp, settlement and community layouts disregard, to a large extent, the ways in which the forcibly displaced inhabit the camps themselves, their personal projects in spaces of waiting with cycles of everydayness recaptured in the environment. It largely fails to account for the challenges of the temporary nature, aid dependence, infrastructural and socioeconomic host fatigue. The application of minimum standards leads to these sites' existence to hover in the endurance mood, generating additional fragilities and frustrations.

Section 3 briefly examined the ways in bridging between humanitarian and development responses in chronic conflict zones. By focusing on planning for forced displacement emerging as camps and settlements set anew, we attempted to understand the design rationale of emerging schemes developed and proposed since the Second World War. First, the section clarifies the sequential relation between emergency and chronic conflict and their impacts on different modes of responses, the forcibly displaced and host communities. Second, the section examined different settlement and camp models and schemes devised to incorporate humanitarian and development components. The focus was on the interplay between the forcibly displaced camps and settlement designs and the ever-shifting policies towards their occupants; swinging between local integration, marginalization, warehousing, well-being and becoming, in different cases, the only resort.

Section 4 focuses on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as a case study representing the theme investigated: Planning for Forced Displacement in Chronic Conflict Zones. This section delves briefly into the history of using settlements and camps to accommodate waves of the forcibly displaced, their physical attributes and the rationales behind their use.

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Kurdistan, the land Kurds claim as their historical entitlement, was divided by map lines set within the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916. Fragmented between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, the fierce conflict over their borders (see Figure IX) to claim the right to Kurdish nationhood has generated multiple waves of displacements, which became attached to the Kurdish experience (McDowall, 2004). The autonomy agreement of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq came in 1970 after multiple uprisings escalated to the Aylul revolts[12] (O'Ballance, 1973). Many revolts have emerged since the declaration of Iraq as a kingdom in 1932 and as a republic in 1958. Revolts resurfaced during the following years and ended temporarily with the 1970 Iraqi-Kurdish peace accord. It took more than 35 years, wars, insurrections, marginalization and acts of oppression reaching genocidal proportions, economic boycotts and sieges, internal conflicts, and the fall of Saddam Hussein's government to get the autonomy agreement fully enshrined in the reformed

Iraqi constitution in 2005.

Located in a chronic conflict zone, with constant geopolitical reconfigurations, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has, since 2004, become a relatively stable geopolitical pocket compared with its contested neighbouring areas across its regional and national borders. Hence, with what appeared as an economic boom between 2005 and 2011, the Kurdistan Region has served as the haven for external and internal waves of displaced persons. However, disputes over internal power, resources control and economic conflicts persist. Unsurprisingly, the after-effects of a severe set of fragilities are still present in Kurdistan today. Building on Schafer's (2002) definition, the modern history of Kurdistan Iraq represents an ideal zone to investigate the role of planning for forced displacement in chronic conflict zones. These fragilities generate shifts and changes in the inhabitability of specific spatial settings and the emergence of new ones. In the following sections, the use of the camps

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12 Aylul (September) revolts, known also as the first Kurdish-Iraqi War, lasted from 1961–1970.

Figure IX: Kurdistan identified by population distribution.
Source: Stansfield, 2003, p. 28.

and settlements to manage and control forced displacement will be explored. We will briefly trace back the emergence of this particular use of camps and settlements after the Second World War. Then, focus will be on the resurgence of using camps and settlements with different rationales for operators and the dwellers.

4.1. Setting Settlements Anew: from Development and Confinement: 1951–1990

4.1.1. The Development Model

Prior to the autonomy agreement, between 1955 and 1959 in Iraq, a modernization movement took place to fulfil the regime's aspirations to "assert a young nation's modernity and nurture pride among its citizens". This movement included new spatial settings of mass housing and new settlements to support and develop the underserved urban and rural regions. Similar to earlier modern schemes, the grand visions linked planning to the rational engineering of social life. Between 1955 and 1961, the Iraq National Housing programme schemes (see Figure X) were developed by Doxiadis Associates, joined by Hassan Fathy at the time[13] (Doxiadis Associates and DBoGI, 1963; Genat, 2017; Pyla, 2007; Stansfield, 2003; Steele, 1997). The design schemes were to encourage and facilitate the "transformation of the village dweller into an urban dweller" and develop "a modern substitute for the traditional gathering places of tribal life" (Pyla, 2006).

Interestingly, the community became the replicable unit of the social ordering of these schemes: 10–15 attached houses creating a community with a "gossip square", supposedly to boost a healthier community spirit. The logic of social ordering through spatial hierarchies were partially carried out through either government-funded housing or self-help housing. The original schemes classified communities' classes based on their income similarities[14] (Pyla, 2006).

13 Hassan Fathy was a member of the Doxiadis Organization in Athens 1957–1962. He engaged in the activities of the Ekistics group, including work on the Iraqi national housing programme, and joining the city of the Future research project then under way at the Ekistics Centre (Steele, 1997).

14 Doxiadis contextualized his abstractions of "scales" and "hierarchies" by arguing that the smaller, class I, II and III communities corresponded to sizes found in Iraqi towns and villages.

Figure X: Housing activities in the national housing programme of Iraq and generic layout for the town. Developed by Doxiadis Associates.
Source: Doxiadis Associates and DBoGI, 1963.

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The first generation of these models labelled in Arabic mojamma't assrya (modern collective مجمعات عصرية) was introduced in 1958–1961 in parallel with the land reforms laws and the collective farms (قرى إسكان للفلاحين). This first generation had iron-grid layouts, connections to improved services and infrastructures compared with the "primitive situation in the unserved villages" (Genat, 2017; Mlodoch, 2017; Recchia, 2014). In Kurdistan Iraq, however, the modern and development aspects of this housing and settlement scheme froze during the Aylul revolts. They were reactivated after signing the autonomy agreement. The need to rebuild the evacuated Kurdish villages and house the forcibly displaced became one of the pillars of this agreement.[15] The Government promised to meet the needs of the displaced population in the region, reconstruct and modernize that which was heavily damaged or destroyed from the armed operations (Genat, 2017).

The period between 1970 and 1974 was considered as the "golden age" in terms of stability and the development of Kurdistan Iraq, with 250 modern villages sprouting in the region and other rural areas.

4.1.2. Algerian Accord and Massive Displacement

The temporary stability ended in 1974 after the resumption of the disputes between the Kurds and the Iraqi Government. Many promises in the autonomy agreement were either breached or were never implemented.[16] These violations led to a failed Kurdish revolt and with the 1975 signing of the Algerian Accord between Iraq and Iran. The agreement included the withdrawal of Iranian support to the Kurdish fighters in the mountains, the Kurdish resistance fleeing from Iraq, and the 30–35 km demarcation and evacuation cordon sanitaire covering Kurdish villages, for national security safety.[17] Between 1975 and 1980, some 400,000 to 700,000 Kurds were evicted and relocated to collective towns for displaced persons, while around 1,400 villages were demolished (McDowall, 2004; Mlodoch, 2017). According to Human Rights Watch report (2004):

"By the late 1970s, the Iraqi Government had forcibly evacuated at least a quarter of a million Kurdish men, women, and children from areas bordering Iran and Turkey. Their villages were destroyed to create a cordon sanitaire along these sensitive frontiers, and the inhabitants relocated to settlements built for that purpose located on the main highways in army-controlled areas of Iraq Kurdistan". (HRW, 2004).

The modern villages schemes were reduced on the ground to collective settlements: a mere grid with a primary function of housing the displaced. Collectives such as Bahrka, Harir, Qushtapa[18] (and more than 100 others) started receiving the forcibly evicted groups from different villages as a counter-insurgency policy (see Figure XI). In this phase, "[t]he uprooting that people underwent was to be counterbalanced by the provision of services and infrastructures" (Recchia, 2014). As such, and for the purposes of control and care, these settlements were placed close to the main road in remote areas but near farmlands, factories and workshops for economic purposes.[19] Communities became simplified rows of concrete block structures with modern utilities and a space for a market, while communal and recreational spaces disappeared, keeping only administrative buildings, education and health units, all controlled by the army (Leezenberg, 2000). This "provision" touched the household level, and the financial compensation for the loss conditioned with the relocation (Genat, 2017), including food rations, conditioned individuals to adhere to the national assimilation programme.[20] On a social aspect, the relocation included regroupings for the populations coming from the same ancestral village. Though the displaced were granted freedom of movement, they were not allowed to return to their villages and farmlands in the buffer zone. This modular style of spatial planning was utterly alien from the farmers' previous habitat, with a drastic implication on culture and lifestyle within the assimilation attempts. Being plucked out of their ancestral land and their traditional ways of life had drastic socioeconomic implications on the whole region to this day.

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15 This plan was put on hold in the Kurdish Region as the political disputes between the Kurdish parties lead by the Mullah Mostafa Barzani supported by the Shah of Iran, and the Iraqi army became bloody (Mahzouni, 2013). Consequently, voluntary and forced evacuation of Kurdish mountain villages rendered "unsafe" have created waves of displaced groups in urgent need of safe shelter.

16 "The first massive wave of forced displacement in northern Iraq [..]. The area comprised some 14,000 square miles but included only half of the land area claimed by Iraq's Kurds and excluded the oil-rich lands around the city of Kirkuk. [..] the Baathist Party embarked on the Arabization of the oil-producing areas around Khanaqin, evicting Kurdish farmers and replacing them with Arab tribal families from southern Iraq". Around 64 Kurdish and Yazidi villages were Arabized (HRW, 2004).

17 "The scale of the displacement of Kurds in the north during the mid-1970s was immense, displacing the entire Kurdish population from an area reaching from the town of Khanaqin, close to the Iranian border, to the Syrian and Turkish border areas around Sinjar. Many Kurdish villages were bulldozed, and new Arab settlements were built nearby" (HRW, 2004).

18 The three mentioned towns were all constructed in 1978, housing displaced persons from different villages and Kurdish tribes evicted from the mountains (Stansfield, 2003).

19 These collective towns were connected to the national electricity grid, water and sanitation networks, including (though inadequate) health and education services (Leezenberg, 2000).

20 Men were forced to enrol in the army while children and youth received military training; women had to attend evening education courses in the national campaign or lose their food ration cards following the compulsory literacy act.

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
Figure XI: Harir Town.
Source: Courtesy to Harir Municipality - Depicted in (Genat, 2017).

4.1.3. The Confinement Model

Between 1980 and 1988, during the Iraq and
Iran war, mistrust and suspicion characterized the
relationship between the Iraqi Government and the
nation's Kurds. The depopulation and destruction of
Kurdish villages increased rapidly while the Arabization
process intensified,[21] escalating to the genocidal
Anfal Campaign[22] (1988). This state of mistrust was
translated materially in what Recchia (2014) labelled
as the second generation of the collective towns. The
use of the modern model changed drastically from
its improvement and upgraded version to one that
was punitive.[23] Between flight and expulsion, the
majority of the displaced Kurd who remained in the
country were resettled in the large-scale complexes
or collective villages built by the Iraqi Government
(Genat, 2017; HRW, 2004; Mahzouni, 2013;
McDowall, 2004; Recchia, 2012). The displaced
received a piece of land and a budget for housing;
they were also provided with monthly food rations.

These settlements were connected with electricity,
water supply systems, schools and health points as

well. The main differences between this model and
the prior one was the rejection of the development
concept and adoption of a containment and control
apparatus. Containment meant these settlements had
gates, fences, military posts, wide roads to facilitate
heavy military machinery. These were reinforced
with cosmetic control elements with the Baathist
regime's symbols and portraits of its leaders (Mlodoch,
2017). These settings were called mojamma't
qassryya (coercive collective مجمعات قسرية), which
revealed: "the ambivalent character of the regime's
collectivization programme" (Genat, 2017; Mlodoch,
2017). It is estimated that 32 towns had been set
up throughout Iraqi Kurdistan at this time, and
were guarded by the army (HRW, 2004). These two
typologies have changed the understanding of an
urban setting as material culture in Kurdistan (Recchia,
2012).

4.1.4. The Detention Model

During the Anfal Campaign in 1988 (see Figure
XII), the Iraqi Government destroyed around 4,050
Kurdish villages and towns, displacing hundreds of

21 In the Human Rights Watch Report (2004) highlighted this process between the 1970s and 1980s "involved […] military force and intimidation: entire Kurdish villages were completely depopulated and bulldozed […]. followed up the brutality with legal decrees aimed at consolidating the displacement […] property deeds of the displaced Kurds were invalidated by legal decree, most frequently without compensation or with nominal compensation. The Iraqi Government nationalized the agricultural lands, making them the property of the Iraqi State […and] embarked on a massive campaign to resettle the formerly Kurdish areas with Arab farmers and their families, thus completing the Arabization process" (HRW, 2004).

22 "Conducted between February and September 1988, Al-Anfal is the bloodiest campaign that Saddam Hussein led against the Kurds. The operation named after Quran's Sura; Al-Anfal literally means "the spoil of war", and it refers to the Battle of Badr against the infidels. In […] seven months, the Kurdistan Region was hit by several strikes with chemical weapons followed by heavy air bombardments on those who tried to escape. It is estimated that 100,000 people died during Anfal" (Recchia, 2014).

23 In this heated political and violent climate, many groups of the Kurds who previously supported the resistance were seen as a potential threat, named as traitors and saboteurs (Moldoch, 2017) that tend to support the enemies of the State.

Figure XII: Anfal Campaign and locations of resettlement complexes.
Source: Human Rights Watch and Black, 1993.

thousands of Kurds (Mlodoch, 2017) while "their livestock would be killed or confiscated, and their agricultural fields and orchards would be destroyed" (Leezenberg, 2004). After the campaign, the Iraqi Baathist Government announced an amnesty in September 1988. The survivors were released from detentions or returned from their hideouts and were ordered to resettle in the Iraqi military's collective towns. In his writings about the Anfal operations in Kurdistan, Leezenberg (2004) describes these settings thus: "After the amnesty, the surviving deportees were brought back to the north and simply dumped on relocation sites near the main roads to the region's major cities, surrounded by barbed-wire fences. Unlike the victims of earlier deportations, they were not provided with any housing, construction materials, food, or medicine (let alone financial compensation), but just left to their own devices".
Mlodoch (2017), in her two-decade work with Anfal Campaign survivors, described the initial stages of these detention sites and the spatially materialized human

life reductions. The Sumud collective, as she wrote, was similar to detention camp-like conditions, guarded by the Iraqi military and Kurdish collaborators. One of Mlodoch's interviewees depicted the situation this way: "The soldiers marked a small plot with sticks. They said, here, this is your place now. And then we went around and collected stones here and there. Some people gave us some bricks, so we build a room".[24]

The occupational groups, primarily women and children, scavenged materials and basic needs from bulldozed villages and homes to make the inhabitable habitable (Simone, 2018). These settings lacked running water, a sewage network, electricity and any sign of life (Leezenberg, 2004). The return to original villages or agricultural lands in the post-Anfal cleared areas was forbidden and punishable by death (Human Rights Watch and Black, 1993).

These situations, over the years, have created an overwhelming experience that fit Kelison's term of

24 Interview with Kurdish women of the Anfal survivors, Rabea, 2002 in (Moldoch, 2017). This statement had been reasserted through different interviews conducted in the field; this included detention, constant humiliation and punishment for "bad Kurds".

sequential traumatization (Keilson, 1992; Mlodoch, 2012): violent rupture and humiliation generationally experienced and still marks the Iraqi Kurdish experiences of forced displacements and wars. Trapped between memory and fear, many of these Kurdish populations never returned to their home towns (Human Rights Watch and Black, 1993), and still live in these collective settlements.

Section 4.1 briefly examined the ways in which modern settlement schemes were employed in the the Kurdish Region between the 1970s and the 1980s. The essential aspiration of the original schemes was to reassert nation State spirit and modernity. In this aspect, the socio-spatial ordering of these schemes focused on urbanization, development and strengthening community spirits. Nevertheless, in the case of Kurdistan, the employment of these schemes concerning forced displacement were event driven. The new settlements' physical components appeared in three modes: collectivization, confinement and detention. These settlements appeared to compensate with modern housing, connection to basic infrastructures and services, service buildings and set close to new livelihood opportunities.

However, these attributes lost their effectiveness by being remotely located, cut from former habitat and later heavily controlled. Furthermore, the settlements' operators (namely the Baathist Government and its allies) devised the soft components to change demographic percentages of the diverse population (implicitly and later explicitly), assimilation to one ethnicity (Arabs), and create State-depended subjects: changing livelihoods patterns, displacement from livelihood resources, substituting all with food rations and State-controlled amenities and opportunities. This occurred while the dwellers were gradually transformed into mere aid dependent subjects, suspicious groups and enemies of the State. In less

than a decade, these settlements were gradually reduced to a grid marked with sticks in the ground. Section 4.2 illustrates the conversion of the use of the settlement and the emergence of relief camps to contain forced displacements and the attempts to transform spaces of oppression into spaces of hospitality and growth through a restoration-development logic. We will go briefly into the historical events that supported these transformations and the ways in which different actors played a role in the attempt to patch up the fragmented groups through spatial and socioeconomic interventions.

4.2. The Relief-Restoration Models: 1991–2003

After the invasion and the annexation of Kuwait to the Iraqi State, the situation in Iraq escalated and reached a breaking point in 1990, leading to the First Gulf War in 1991.[25] Profiting from the Iraqi army's disorder and defeat in Kuwait, large-scale uprisings spread against the Government, including the Kurds and Shias in the north and the south, respectively. Nevertheless, these uprisings were easy to crush; individuals were brutally suppressed, detained or killed. Around 2 million refugees crossed and filled the mountainous borders with Turkey and Iran, living in harsh conditions, adding to the pre-existing problem resulted from the 1988 Anfal Campaign (Rudd, 2004; Yildiz, 2004). The humanitarian situations for refugees within and across the Iraqi Kurdistan borders, namely Iran and Turkey, deteriorated dramatically and required drastic intervention. Consequently, The United Nations Security Council passed resolution 688 to remove the threat on international security and peace and ensure safe passage for humanitarian aid (UNSC, 1991). This declared northern Iraq a no-fly zone (see Figures XIII and XIV) and a safe haven for humanitarian interventions to ensure refugees' safe return to Kurdistan Iraq (HRW, 2004; Leezenberg, 2000).

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25 Iraqi troops led by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and its annexation to the Iraqi State led to issuing the UNSC 678 resolution (UNSC, 1991) and the creation offer a 35-nation military coalition led by the United States Army. These fought Iraq in the Gulf War from 1990 to 1991, and the military action code named Operation Desert Storm to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

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Figure XIII: Map of Iraq showing air restrictions
and no-fly zones (33, 36 lines) covering the Kurdish Zone between 1991 and 2003.
Source: Veritans. Jones, 2008.

Figure XIV: The "protected enclave"
set by the allied forces in 1991, and the powers in control in 1992.
Source: Institute Kurde De Paris, 1992.

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This phase had several components regarding the use of camps and settlements for the forcibly displaced, incorporated in two dimensions. The first one was setting temporary military-style relief resettlement camps and rehabilitating the damaged urban areas. This component included transforming the coercive collective settlements and complexes into spaces of resilience and progress. The second dimension was setting up and empowering institutional frames and governmental bodies that seem to be the root of the current Kurdistan Regional Government (Yildiz, 2004). It can also be read in the immediate relief phase and the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme phase.

4.2.1. Back from the Mountains: The Relief Model

With the enactment of resolution 688 in 1991, United States President George H.W. Bush announced that operations Provide Comfort and Encourage Hope would be established in the hot spot of northern Iraq and United Nations -protected enclaves.[26] The aspiration of the protected enclaves in the northern parts was to encourage the Kurdish refugees, mainly in Turkish camps, to return. [27]

Under Operation Encourage Hope, Cuny, the earlier mentioned reputable humanitarian practitioner and sharing military operations' logic, advised setting a safe zone for the Kurds to return. The allied military forces started to map routes dotted with way-stations to provide comfort to the returnees. In addition, the troops were responsible for setting up the refugee camps to facilitate practical extensive scale relief efforts, converting the region into an intensified arena of relief operations (Yildiz, 2004). It is crucial to keep in mind the military logic of quick response and withdrawal: "The basic concept of operations included the following tenants: 1) meet life-sustaining requirements immediately; 2) establish a manageable relief process that could be easily transferred; 3) promote the role of non-military organizations and maximize the participation of international agencies; 4) seek active refugee participation during site development and operations, and 5) ensure the security of light troops and dislocated civilians" (Brown, 1995).

The strategy was to set a series of rely points within Iraqi Kurdistan. These sites were food distribution points, way-stations, temporary and resettlement camps in the lowlands (see Figures XV and XVI). Ironically, some of these sites were set up earlier by the Baathist Government as collective towns in the late 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Kani Masi, Begova); transforming into hosting settings and subverted their notion from confinement to relief.

The resettlement camp in Kurdistan resembled the work of Cuny and his Intertect team. Being present in the field, the team used the communities ordered camp (Cuny, 1977): they reappropriated camps designed by the United States Marine Corps to "adjust to the needs of the Kurds", aspiring to match cultural sensitivities[28] and the groups' economy (Rudd, 2004). Interestingly, the physical components had both: the community in decentralized villages, a hybrid scheme between the camp and the settlement models appeared (2.2.2). The model used local language; the physical components were zanon (communities) of 60 persons, grouped into gunds (villages) of 1,000 people creating a bajeer (settlement) of 21,000–45,000. In 1991, at least 10 resettlement camps were set in two months, while the Turkish camps across the border were about to be closed (Brown, 1995; Rudd, 2004).[29]

In camps (and largely the way-stations), the physical component covered clearing the land, erecting tents, enhanced sanitation and securing the minefields. The soft component included the provision programme of distribution of food and fuel rations, health care facilities, camp dwellers training and activate participation by working with Kurdish leaders and empowering refugees. As the camps were still temporary, the operation included different attempts to rehabilitate the damaged infrastructures and services in the Zakho area. Electricity generators, water distribution points, wastewater treatments, water purification, and medical clinics were all set in place and running in no time. These provision efforts lasted for two months with expectations of stabilization as the "survival needs were being met", and the mission was accomplished with the return of

26 In president G. Bush speech 1991: "I have directed the US military to begin immediately to establish several encampments in northern Iraq where relief supplies for these refugees will be made available in large quantities and distributed in orderly manner… adequate security will be provided at these temporary sites by the US, British and French air and ground horses, […] all we are doing is motivated by humanitarian concerns" (Brown, 1995).

27 "The priorities established were: 1) to stop the dying and suffering; 2) to resettle the population at temporary sites we are establishing a stable, secure, sustainable environment in northern Iraq; and 3) to return the displaced civilians to their former homes" (Brown, 1995).

28 "Cuny helped these units adjust to the needs of the Kurds. For example, when the MEU engineers began putting up the tents, they wanted to align them in an efficient checkerboard pattern similar to that of a military encampment. But Cuny recommended that they be arranged in clusters that allowed families and extended groups some autonomy. […] the engineers favoured latrines known as three-holers, which could accommodate several people at the same time. Again, Cuny explained that the Kurds would not share latrines, making the single enclosed models more useful" (Rudd, 2004).

29 All the words in italics are in Kurdish used dialect used in the northern parts of Kurdistan. Zanon also translates into "pasture land, which was part of the seasonal migration for farms and semi-nomads" (van Bruinessen, 1992).

Figure XV: Diagram of the safe roads, way stations, food distribution points that were secured and allocated in the protected enclave.
Source: Brown, 1995.

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Figure XVI: Arial view of one of the camps near Zakho in 1991.
It is clear hybridity: the Community Unit Model by Cuny and Intertect and the villages in the organized settlement.
Source: Brown, 1995.

the refugees back home. Although the situation was still critical the military mission could not continue the work indefinitely. Shortly, the responsibility of the humanitarian relief in the region was handed over to the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR.

4.2.2. Beyond Emergency: Restoration and Rehabilitation Models

With the withdrawal of Iraqi civil and military presence from the region, Kurdistan fell into an administrative, legislative and institutional vacuum (Leezenberg, 2000; Natali, 2010). Despite the presence of the

de facto Kurdish Regional Government,[30] it had an ambivalent international recognition and was illegal to the central Government of Iraq (Leezenberg, 2000; McDowall, 2004; Natali, 2010; Yildiz, 2004). With the mutual accusations of betrayal, the polarization of access to aid, a double economic embargo,[31] and internal warfare in 1994,[32] the general situation became chaotic, violent and insecure; the political climate became unstable and the economy paralysed. These factors gave United Nations bodies the legitimacy to act as a "surrogate State" and substituted the Kurdistan Regional Government (Crisp and Slaughter, 2009; Kagan, 2011; Miller, 2018)

30 This "vacuum" made room for the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (a collision formed in late 1988s included KDP, PUK and other major Iraqi Kurdish parties) to hold elections in 1992 and self-declared a de facto Kurdistan Regional Government (Yildiz, 2004).

31 With external international economic sanctions on the central Government of Iraq, the central Government placed the Kurdistan Region under economic siege, which paralyzed the region at the time (Yildiz, 2004).

32 A political rift between the Kurdistan Regional Government's main leading parties, KDP and PUK, accelerated into a civil war and sorted and shifted populations towards patronage zones. This civil war ended with the United States mediation and the signing of the Washington agreement in 1998, resulting in the demarcation of administrative areas divided between the central and regional governments (Yildiz, 2004).

institutional quasi-State bodies.[33] Nevertheless, the Regional Government still worked on its institutional reform: new ministries were created for reconstruction and development, Peshmerga affairs, and culture. In addition, the Regional Government liaised with central Government programmes and established a Council of Governors at the presidential level to work with international non-government organizations, the United Nations and donor agencies (Natali, 2010).

In 1995, the Oil-for-Food Programme was established to allow Iraq to sell oil for the world market in exchange for food, medicine and other domestic humanitarian needs without allowing Iraq to boost its military capabilities[34] (UNSC, 1995). UN-Habitat, under Oil-for-Food, implemented the Settlements Rehabilitation Programme targeting vulnerable and displaced groups. The Rehabilitation Programme's physical components included spatial renewal, self-built models, services and urban infrastructural improvements. The Rehabilitation Programme's soft component focused on society and local authorities to be integrated with the rehabilitation projects through: empowerment, capacity enhancement and participation in the planning and implementation of the Rehabilitation Programme (UN-Habitat, 2001, 2002). One can read this period as the root of linking humanitarian and development to stability in the Kurdistan Region.

4.2.2.1. Collective Towns: To Dismantle or to Upgrade?

The selection of the intervention sites included identifying current and former settlements of internally displaced persons, assessments of the physical situation of the settlements, and the presence of socioeconomic networks. Collective towns emerged in the (UN-Habitat, 2001) reports as a settlement typology apart from the ruler in urban settlement[35]

(UN-Habitat, 2001). Fifty-two collective towns were selected for this scheme out of 625. Unsurprisingly, these collective towns were paralyzed: 13–25 per cent of the dwellings were either poorly self-built or still just tents.[36] They relied heavily on institutional and humanitarian aid, which many of them still do to this day.[37] In the earlier stages of the programme, the intent was to dismantle the collective towns, as they were viewed as instruments of suppression and reminders of violence, and resettle the coercively displaced back to their villages after being reconstructed (Mlodoch, 2017).

As established earlier, the former dispossession from the ancestral land also led to restructuring these groups' internal formation by separating and reshuffling them and planting them in an alien setting. A survey in 1998[38] reported that around 85 per cent of the population in collective towns was a mix from different tribes, meaning that former community bonds were also ruptured or severely damaged.[39] Though all were Iraqi Kurds at the time, they differed in subcultural habits and tradition. These differences added to the social splits reasserted with different patronage relations with political parties, mainly KDP and PUK, or groups affiliated to the Iraqi Baathist Government before 1991. Hence, phrases like "assimilation processes" kept resurfacing in these reports, with the need to bridge the boundaries within the different Kurdish groups and other ethnic minorities like Assyrians, Turkmens, and Arabs (UN-Habitat, 2003).

Though expectations were that many IDPs would return to their rehabilitated villages of origin (UN-Habitat, 2001, 2002), they became more vulnerable, following their prolonged displacement, and still had needs. Furthermore, the partially destroyed socio-spatial infrastructures, the scarcity of livelihood

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33 United Nations Security Council resolution 986 and the memorandum of understanding signed between the United Nations and the central Government in 1996 gave the United Nations Inter-agency humanitarian programme the role of acting on behalf of the central Government to transport and distribute humanitarian aid for international non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies to the Kurdistan Region. This role was delegated to United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (Volcker, Goldstone and Pieth, 2005a). Other United Nations agencies had been active since 1996, including the Food and Agricultural Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, UNESCO, UNOPS, World Food Programme, and the World Health Organization (Volcker et al., 2005a). According to Natali (2010), some of the agencies even acted as "operating as ministries: the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq as a Council of Ministries, UN-Habitat as a Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, and the United Nations Children's Fund as a Ministry of Water and Sanitation".

34 The Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP) was established under United Nations Security Council resolution 986. The programme was constituted to elevate civilians' extended suffering due to the sanctions imposed on Iraq under United States President Bill Clinton's administration after the First Gulf war. In the OFFP programme, the Kurdish Region was targeted to receive 13 per cent of Iraqi oil sales proceeds to ease hardships and provide humanitarian goods and reconstruction projects for civilians.

35 A total 397 sites of displacement were identified: collective towns, urban areas, virtual sites and IDP neighbourhoods (individual dwelling scattered). At the time, the number of IDPs was estimated at 22.91 per cent of the region's population (UN-Habitat, 2001).

36 This percentage is probably linked with the year of construction, and the group being made up of returning refugees.

37 Interview with the mayor of Basirma, one of the former collective towns, 2019.

38 The survey was done in the summer of 1998 by the Durham University Policy Planning Unit and the Ministry of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in the Kurdistan Region in Erbil and the Directorate of Statistics in Sulaymaniyah (Stansfield, 2003).

39 For more detailed information about the collective towns' populations, geographical location and the year of construction, see Stansfield (2003).

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opportunities hindered the desire to return to their original towns (UN-Habitat, 2001).

The former spaces of origin embodied the psychological and traumatic experiences and constant reminders of loss. In comparison, the displacement sites provided consistent aid, newly formed networks, and shared experiences of resilience weaved upon the socio-spatial fabrics and rooted deeper in the new locality. According to the UN-Habitat report in 2001, more than 55 per cent of the participants stayed in their new locations. Therefore, the focus on improving collective towns became one of the main components of the Settlement Rehabilitation Programme (SRP).[40] The recommendations for humanitarian actions regarding these settlements included "urgent relief, income generation, assistance to the disabled, housing redevelopment and reconstruction, resettlement, rehabilitation, and infrastructure allocation" (UN-Habitat, 2001). Nevertheless, the degree of intervention was linked to geographical proximity, with a view to redevelopment, but hardly touching remote settlements.

4.2.2.2. Reconstruction of Kurdish Villages

Some of the areas and Kurdish villages destroyed in the 1980s still had reconstruction plans under the SRP. These projects provided opportunities for income generation for a large group of unemployed workers who did not have access to the labour market due to the double embargo and the dire situation. This encouraged many internally displaced Kurds to return to their villages and participate in the reconstruction process.

Although UN-Habitat's programmes provided skilled and unskilled labour with jobs under small contracts, many people thought they were for favoured persons. Moreover, many former central Government supporters (later pardoned by the Kurdistan Regional Government) or affiliated personnel with the leading parties have started different businesses to respond to the needs of the humanitarian sector. Local businessmen, through their relationships of patronage, had access to United Nations contracts as they altered their activities (to a local NGO or a private business) to meet the demand, especially for oil, transport, food, medicine, and trading for the construction market (Leezenberg, 2000; Natali, 2010).

These factors resulted in differences in implementing the reconstruction schemes and gaining access to aid within the parties and administrative areas. This, then, tipped the balance of income and investment in some geographical locations while the forgotten towns deteriorated gradually.

4.2.2.3. Under the Common Approach

Amongst the recommendations in UN-Habitat's report (2002, 2003), the Settlement Rehabilitation Programme became a long-term project named Under the Common Roof Approach. This project expands the planning frame to cover regions, cities and towns. Hence, "to facilitate and rationalize planning and programming activities", the soft components included conducting surveys, compiling a spatial database and developing methods. These reports also emphasize developing transport interlinkage schemes and stress adhering to the master plans in the region's three major cities. Furthermore, the institutional upgrade in Kurdistan became essential to activate the "collaborative arrangement existing between UN-Habitat and local authorities" (UN-Habitat, 2002).

Despite the Oil-for-Food corruption scandal that led to the programme's termination in 2003 (Volcker, Goldstone and Pieth, 2005b), this period provided continuity in the external aid for Kurdistan, paving the path to economic recovery and rehabilitation, of sorts (Natali, 2010).

However, several factors impacted the possibilities of balance and effectiveness of the SRP in Kurdistan. Contextually, these were the conditionalities imposed by the central Government, the absence of political trust, and the Regional Government's internal instability linked to patronage, privatization, aid and favouritism. The approach on the ground also suffered: the physical components of spatial interventions were mere end products, lacking activation factors;[41] while the soft components became mere training and informing, lacking a milieu for continuity. All were adding to the dire economic situation, migration into urban areas in search of opportunities, which prevented any other forms of self-investment and crippled the periphery. Most of those who remained became part of the fragile urban squatter populations, with high illiteracy levels and various incremental social problems.

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40 In 2002, the operational activities report by UN-Habitat referred explicitly to that the work that covered the collective towns, namely the "renovation of approximately 10,450 houses, upgrading the water and sanitation infrastructure in towns, improving internal roads, construction of 388 classrooms and construction of 12 new health centres".

41 "Schools were rebuilt without books, clinics were established without medicines or qualified physicians, and village houses were constructed without vital services such as electricity, access roads, and potable water" (Natali, 2010).

4.3. The Rehabilitation Development and Revitalization Models 2004–2012

Until 2003, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was a "partially legitimized territory of Iraq, dependent on external [and internal] patronage[s] for survival" (Natali, 2010). The region suffered from constrained and crippled development interventions on short intervals, while the Regional Government was cautious about maintaining validation.

After the Iraq war and the defeat of President Saddam Hussein's Government in April 2003,[42] with a poorly calculated aftermath, southern and central Iraq fell into protracted conflict. Aid funds were funneled mainly into the unstable regions to ease hardships, reduce insurgencies and stabilize the situation amidst growing insecurities. Comparably, the situation in Kurdistan changed dramatically, given the relative stability, constitutional recognition of the Region's Government as a distinct political entity,[43] and the devolution of the power of the central Government. The Regional Government took steps at institutional reforms and upgrades[44] in the following years, and gained sovereignty within its territorial boundaries. Being the direct recipient of funding from aid agencies – without United Nations agencies acting as middlemen,[45] and despite the decrease in the aid budget – the situation in Kurdistan improved. The operations under the Oil-for-Food Programme were handed over to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.

The no-fly zone and all United States military operations were in theory terminated, the Green Line demilitarized, followed by the end of the double embargo. Therefore, the Kurdistan Region represented a stabilized enclave within the chronic conflict, attracting various groups, agencies and investments. United Nations projects were to be resumed under the Advance Development Provincial Reconstruction undertaking, with a special budget to develop

Kurdistan's three governorates that grew significantly, adding to the Regional Government's federal budget allocation.[46] The revenues touched all aspects of life in Kurdistan: security, construction, including large infrastructure projects such as road rehabilitation, water treatment plants, power transmission substations, hydropower stations. These revenues, additionally, supported private sector development, the creation of the industrial zone, and the enhanced spatial and commodity flows between Kurdish cities with the rest of Iraq. Moreover, national capacity-building projects supported by the United States regional reconstruction aid team and the World Bank focused on local governance, policy reform, service delivery, public participation, and civil society in the decision-making processes.

Focusing on settlements and the displaced, development projects became the concern for the United Nations field agencies. The aid programme became vital, with longer-term plans covering the physical components of the urban structure (schools, hospitals, clinics) and improvement infrastructure (electricity, water, sewage, roads). The soft component also witnessed intensive capacity-building programmes, human rights campaigns, and similarly on gender-based violence, and civic education.

4.3.1. Former Displacement Sites

These aforementioned changes have definitely played a role in transforming the physical nature and the meaning of former displacement sites (collective, coercive and detention ones). Some of these towns benefited from the overall stability and started showing characters of urbanity and progress with the Regional Government's investments in their improvement. In her work, Mlodoch (2017) traced this transformation. Improvements covered public facilities (health, education, public buildings) and the rehabilitation and modernization of water, sewage and road infrastructure. In addition to pensions for the

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42 The United States Government's banners on the "Reconstruction of One Iraq" fell quickly, revealing strategic interests in Iraqi oil and gas resources. The "liberation" was accompanied by normative components of "Democracy Mission" conveying "new norms", such as good governance, decentralization, civil society building and minority group rights throughout Iraq.

43 Article 117 in the Iraqi constitution specifically recognizes the Kurdistan Region as an integral component of federal Iraq, with Kurdish and Arabic as the official languages. Political processes and institutions also became more representative to include diverse parties, ethnic and religious groups. Despite their ongoing political differences, the KDP and PUK decided to run one unified Kurdistan list for the Iraqi parliament and Kurdistan National Democratic list for the KNA for December 2005 legislative elections. Additionally, the Kurds gained substantial representation in Baghdad with Jalal Talabani (former head of PUK) becoming a president, and many of the officials were of Kurdish regions as ministers.

44 On 21 January 2006, Ma'soud Barzani and Jalal signed the unification agreement, which established the framework in which the KDP and PUK parties could govern the region once again. The agreement merged the KDP and the PUK administrations into one regional government entity and established the institutional mechanisms leading to full institutional reform and upgrade. By 2009, the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament was in place, allowing for the younger generation to participate in political life. The age of membership in the parliament was lowered from 30 to 25 in 2009.

45 The newly devised institutional framework and the constitutional legitimacy enabled the Kurdistan Regional Government to achieve a higher degree of autonomy to alter laws, aside from the foreign policy and financial issues. The region had its own police and security forces, control of natural resources within its official boundaries, including certain petroleum fields (Natali, 2010).

46 The money embezzled in the Oil-for-Food Programme added to the budget allocated for rehabilitation grew at least three times larger than the previous one. The Regional Government received 17 per cent of the full federal budget.

Anfal survivors, families received budgets for houses or reconstruction. Few towns started to witness rapid transformation and the construction of two-storied painted houses. Those who arrived as children had their own families, with additional privileges (scholarships, employment), and had their households in town. The activation bypassed spatial upgrades and touched socioeconomic aspects, especially individuals with access to capital or income-generating activities. Interestingly, the flexibility of the confining modular layout became an advantage, allowing expansion to absorb population growth. What was once an apparatus for suppression became a site of pride, progression, hospitality and prosperity (Mlodoch, 2017; Recchia, 2012). As such, similar sites were turning into busy medium-sized towns, which were approximate to each other. These grew dramatically, forming one settlement (like Chamchamal and Shoresh) or got swallowed by the growth of major cities (see Figure XVII). Towns that had and approximate locations to major cities or industrial sites had a more noticeable share of this upgrade scheme.

4.3.2. From Disciplinary Spaces to Arrival Infrastructures

Unsurprisingly, the 2004 war and its aftermath produced waves of the internally displaced landing on the region's relatively stable shores. Different groups from central and southern Iraq crossed federal boundaries seeking refuge in the Kurdistan. Ironically, once set up for confinement, the collective settlements transformed into hospitable and temporary reception sites for Iraqi's displaced (non-Kurds majority). The empty existing infrastructure became handy. In towns such as Rizgary,[47] vacant structures became safe shelters (Mlodoch, 2017). Nevertheless, the fear of a new style of Arabization reflected the request to build camps for the IDPs, as "the most efficient way to control the displaced Arabs while providing them with assistance" (UNHCR, 2007; Younès, 2007). However, United States officials and UNHCR opposed the idea of the camp, seeing them as potential ghettos (Younès, 2007). No reports indicate that any of these intents materialized.

47 One of the 1987 collective coercive settlements set the Baathist Government to confine families displaced from five different demolished villages from the buffer zone (Stansfield, 2003). The town is in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, closer to the federal border with Iraq. The town's population was almost 20,000; primarily women and children of the rebels' families, where most men were never seen again. The town's name was Sumud, which was changed to Rizgary after the Kurds took over (Moldoch, 2017).

Figure XVII: Daratoo, Kurdistan, northern Iraq. Collective towns where initially disconnected from main cities; the fast pace of contemporary urbanization, however, is turning them in important urban cores.
Source: Photo credit Leo Novel in (Recchia, 2014).

In comparison, camps were the facility used to accommodate Kurdish refugees. According to a UNHCR (2007) report, about 4,000 Iranian Kurdish refugees, from the 1980s, were transferred from central Iraq to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. They were housed in two planned refugee camps that were converted into the Barika and Kawa settlements. Moreover, about 12,000 Kurdish refugees from Turkey were transferred to the Makhmour refugee settlement (UNHCR, 2007). All three settlements were either close by or merged into to a former collective town.

It is worth mentioning here that around 700 Syrian Kurds were displaced in Iraq because of the violent events of 2004 in Qamishli, Syria (Tejel, 2009). Some of these families rented houses in the Domiz settlement in Duhok, built in the 1980s to house Iraqi military officials, a military base in 2003, then partially abandoned by its citizens or rented cheaply (HRW, 2004). Today, Domiz Camp hosts the largest Syrian refugee camp in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

4.3.3. Crippled Urbanization

Although there has been remarkable progress in Kurdistan, the region is still hanging by a thread, swinging between development and dependency. The conditionalities that the central Government enforced between 1991 and 2003 were replaced by the United States Government as well as the international and humanitarian communities. Flooding the country with provisions instead of empowerment with minimum locally produced goods, the region became the free zone for a neo-liberal market and a consumption-based presence.[48] The Kurdish region became a buffer and a haven as long as it did not become "too autonomous". Traditional social, political structures continue to hinder political reforms. The emergent private sector in the Kurdish quasi-State also remained tainted by past policies and the damage inflicted on the market and economy.

Furthermore, the Advance Development Provincial Reconstruction Programme and progression overlooked major cities, while essential services were still missing in the region's most impoverished parts. Other towns remote from the city or vibrant urban cores have not been as fortunate, most of them faced out-migration, leaving those who cannot afford to leave behind, and the situation is in constant deterioration (Basirma town, for example), with many,

such as Baherka, turning into slums (see Figure XVIII). Extremely uneven development between the city and the periphery created unprecedented inequality leading to unbalanced core-periphery urbanization (Mahzouni, 2013).

Section 4.2. established that forced displacement waves constitute a norm in this region, with their sites in constant reincarnation, reproduced for different purposes and meanings. Nevertheless, many shared similar features: iron-grid layout, care and control mentality, and undetermined future scenarios. Through briefly examining the attempts to link relief and development programmes in Kurdistan between 2003 and 2011, approaches to camps and settlements differed concerning the occupant group within the themes of unfinished reconstruction and development.

Through this historical overview, one can read how particular humanitarian-development interventions played an essential role in the spatial progressions of displacement sites. The development and reconstruction programmes reached many collective towns, turning them into busy hubs and middle-sized settlements. The flexibility of the physical components of the grid provided room for expansion, growth and new functions, while the programme's focus on its physical upgrades and insertions of modified soft components (skills upgrade, empowerment, income generation activities) played a role in the stabilization and progression of such sites. Additionally, with such a concentration of opportunities and vacancies caused by the migration of labour, the empty spaces were filled by new waves of forcibly displaced populations. The steadfastness of these groups and different programmes supported the conversion from suppression and oppression into pride of survival, prosperity and hospitality (Mlodoch, 2017; Recchia, 2012).

For the newly displaced, relief camps reverted to temporariness and distancing the IDP Arabs in fear of a new wave of Arabization, while those camps were set to accommodate Iranian and Turkish Kurdish refugees transformed into settlements and integrated with the urban landscape.

Nevertheless, according to the different interviews with the United Nations agencies and central Government personnel, the isolated settings still

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48 The legitimacy allowed the Kurdistan Regional Government to behave like a quasi-development state, emphasizing the openness of its economy with minimum state role in investment and almost unconditional private sector support. Kurdistan became the most active neo-liberal market in the Middle East, iterating between "bazaar cash economy" and "semi-market exchange" (Natali, 2010).

Figure XVIII: Bahrka (a former collective town).
Erbil city sprawl of newly constructed compounds is swallowing the town. Notice the buffer between the IDP camp and the town.
Source: based on wego.here maps.

suffer from severe inequality and efficacy of essential services and structures as well as socioeconomic failures, despite continuous efforts. Simultaneously, displacement sites swollen by urbanization became slums of the nearby cities. Dependency on humanitarian and institutional aid is paramount for sustaining everyday life. Hence, the visible stability is just one pebble away from turning again into chaos, where chronic instability threats from across federal and national borders are constant reminders of the evils of the recent past.

Section 5 will delve into the past decade of waves of forced displaced persons arriving In Kurdistan. It will go briefly into the recent events of the Syrian conflict and the rise and fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – that generated these waves. The section will also examine the ways in which camps and settlements are employed to care for the displaced. The focus will be on the humanitarian and development logic working their way within these situations to mitigate and control the situation.

In the past decade, characterization of the region a zone of future chronic conflict has been reaffirmed by several events: the Syrian conflict, the war on ISIS, the fiscal crisis,[49] renewed political unrests, armed conflicts across and within the borders, and the Covid-19 pandemic coupled with unprecedented drops in crude oil prices (UNHCR, 2020a). In Kurdistan Iraq, the cascade of crises seems to be working in tandem, unmaking or triggering new ones, generating waves of forcibly displaced groups, reshaping the region's urban landscapes, and turning the situation in the region into a "full-blown humanitarian crisis" (World Bank, 2015). The number of the registered refugees and IDPs in the region is about 1 million (UNHCR, 2020e). This section will focus mainly on the planned humanitarian camps and settlements for this study's purpose: refugee and IDP camps.

5.1. Armed Conflicts Trigger Massive Influxes of Displaced Persons

5.1.1. Syrian Conflict 2011

Since the Syrian conflict erupted in 2011, 11.6 million people have been displaced, with 5.5 million registered as refugees (UNHCR, 2020d). The Kurds – an historically marginalized ethnicity in Syria (Tejel, 2009) – in the north-east parts of Syria experienced the displacement slightly differently. Non-state actors seized control over Rojava (the Kurdish inhabited north-eastern parts) by mid-2012 (Allsopp, 2015; Harling, 2013) alongside the congestion of internally displaced flows from other rural and urban areas. Combined with the ever-latent danger from the Turkish borders and the fear of being persecuted by the ambiguous tides of power as "enemies of the sovereign", waves of Syrian Kurds crossed the borders to Iraqi Kurdistan to arrive at their fatherland's realized part: "KURDISTAN" (Zibar, Abujidi and de Meulder, 2021). Ethnic similarities, political aspirations, territorial belonging and concentrations of opportunities of the region's economic revival (World Bank, 2015) paved the ground for a more particular situation for this group to arise. Hence, the move was anticipatory for many refugees (Kunz, 1973); after all, it moves from supposedly one home towards another.

The first massive wave of refugees in urgent need of shelter arrived in 2012. With the previous engagement of the international humanitarian regime, the logical solution to absorb the relentless waves of refugees in need of immediate protection and shelter was planned camps. Between 2012 and 2013, while the Domiz Camp sheltered groups beyond its planned capacity, seven other camps were under construction (Middle East Research Institute, 2015). The particularity of these refugees combined with relief and support responses for the registered refugees was complemented with tolerance measures for the "brothers and guests" (RUDAW, 2019). In addition to the right to shelter camps, the tolerance measures included free access to health services, education, minimum labour restrictions, freedom of movement in Kurdistan, and permission to seek work (Etemadi) (Khan, Mansour-Ille and Nicolai, 2020; UNHCR, 2020e; Yassen, 2019). In no time, these refugee camps[50] were mushrooming to become the spatial representation of this arrival and locality of the support. Interestingly, six of these refugee camps have been are annexed to a former collective town.[51]

5.1.2. Rise of ISIS

In June 2014, when a power vacuum developed in large parts of Syria and Iraq (Leezenberg, 2017), ISIS rose to fill the void and intensified its armed attacks and movements across borders (see Figure XIX). Most of these operations rendered life impossible; there was destruction, killing, bombarding and intensive military operations. As their previous habitat became inhabitable, many Arab and Yazidi Iraqis fled in droves (Kunz, 1973) to areas controlled by the Kurdish Regional Government (World Bank, 2015). Most IDPs headed to camps where basic aid and services provide were available. Most arrived at these facilities with almost nothing, and most were injured or traumatized, or both, by the atrocities of the violent experience[52] (World Bank, 2015). Similar to the Syrian waves of IDPs, more than 26 planned camp sites mushroomed to cater to the displaced and contain the problems[53] within Kurdistan Iraq. Some of these camps are located near collective towns or refugee camps, creating a constellation of forced displacement arrival structures.

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49 The central Government in Baghdad failed to pass a budget in 2014 and did not make the agreed fiscal transfers to KRG, contracting the region's fiscal space (World Bank, 2015).

50 These camps are Domiz 1, Domiz 2 and Gawilan; and Bardarsh in Duhok Governorate, Kawergwesk, Dara Shakran, Queshtapa; and Basirma in Erbil Governorate; and Arbat in Sulaymaniyah Governorate. Bardarsh was an IDP camp, closed in 2017. In 2019, it was reopened as a refugee camp.

51 Except for Darashakran Refugee Camp, the Domiz Camp, as mentioned in section 3.2.2, has its own share of displacement history.

52 The World Bank (2015) report stated the following: "An immediate need is seen for housing and shelter in KRI. Adequate shelter needs to be provided immediately to more than 243,000 vulnerable IDPs. Providing adequate shelter for such a large population has proven an immense challenge for both KRG and the international humanitarian community. The government has built 26 IDP camps across the three KRI governorates with a total combined capacity for hosting 223,790 IDPs."

53 For IDPs, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has the primary coordination responsibility with its cluster system. While UNHCR still works in coordination with the cluster system and in the field. There are huge overlaps between the work of the two agencies, leading to confusion.

Figure XIX: ISIS disposition Map in 2016.
The map shows the expansion of ISIS control and the concentration of ethnic groups in Syria and Iraq.
Source: Produced by U.S. Army Maps (2016).

5.2. Conceiving the Planned Humanitarian Camps

Since 2011, Iraqi Kurdistan has been the arena of substantial humanitarian operations for the massively displaced.[54] The local humanitarian regime utilized the master plan approach for refugee camps as an emergency response to for refugees or IDPs. The approach has proven effective in the peak moments by providing necessary infrastructure and shelter, acting as a spatial apparatus to cope with the massive influxes.

5.2.1. The Emergency Phase

In the cases of refugees and IDPs, most humanitarian camps were set up and operational in the emergency phase. Use of the refugee settlement approach to set up temporary camps is unmistakable evidence of this strategy. As a hybrid between the temporary settlement and the settlement folio paradigms, the "conceived space" (Lefebvre, 1991), the local humanitarian regime erected more than 40 fenced camps of standardized modular grids. Establishment of these facilities required clearing the land to seed the

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54 In November 2020, the central Government of Iraq announced the closure of all IDP camps outside the Kurdistan Regional Government-controlled territories. According to NRC, IOM and BBC news, this measure took effect in August 2019, but was interrupted temporarily by the COVID-19 pandemic (BBC, 2020).

Figure XX: Basirma Refugee Camp in Erbil opened in 2013 in the emergency phase.
The typologies used to accommodate the influx were tents and caravans, all to be replaced by
upgraded shelter by 2021 (due to covid-19 interruptions).
Source: Courtesy to UNHCR, 2014.

camp. The physical components were blocks of groups of communities[55] of families across the region. Most camps, such as Basirma, had breaks in the grid layout due to site characteristics (such as, topography, flash flood) or changes to host parallel urban structures dedicated to serving the recipients of aid exclusively; for example, administration, schools, primary health centres (see Figure XX).

5.2.1.1. Improved Shelter

In the early camps, such as Domiz, local humanitarian response provided each family with shelter. Each family was assigned to a plot with communal latrines. However, because of cultural sensitivities, protection and gender issues, new camps were constructed in which communal latrines were scrapped and wash facilities were provided to each family plot. As the situation prolonged, and with the harsh winter conditions, the idea was to provide improved shelter in all camps. This typology consists of a plot with a concrete slab with three rows of standardized bricks to support the standard UNHCR tent, brick-walled utilities, including kitchen, bathroom and toilet (see Figure XXI). These utilities have separate grey-black water systems in the majority of the camps and are all connected to one septic tank per community.

55 A standardized community unit consists of 16 shelter plots (plot size 7 m X 14 m, including roads and pavements).

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
Figure XXI: Community unit for planning the camp consists of 16 plots.
This model is the improved shelter model used in refugee and IDP camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
in the early stages of planning
Source: Image by the Author (2018) and schemes courtesy UNHCR Iraq (2013).

5.2.1.2. Coordinating Service Provision

Departments at governorate level contribute to service provision: the Department of Sewage supplies water and makes connections to sewage networks, and the Electricity Department provides links to the electricity grid. At the same time, others play a role in the provision of public services in terms of security (the police and the Asayish office); health, education (Department of Education; and labour (Department of Labour and Social Affairs) (UNHCR Iraq, 2019). To handle these open-ended tasks, on the one hand, the Kurdish Regional Government established institutional bodies for coordination and management. The bodies were the Joint Crisis Coordination Centre set up in 2014 and the Board of Relief and Humanitarian Affairs (BRHA) in Duhok Governorate, established in 2015. On the other hand, the UNHCR shelter sector is part of OCHA's Inter-Agency Standing Committee,[56] which employs the cluster strategy (such as, shelter,

protection, wash) to cater to the displaced persons and refugees (GSC, IFRC and UNHCR, 2018).

5.2.2. Beyond Emergency: Spatial Progression in Refugee Camps

In Kurdistan, the majority of forced displacement receiving sites all appear to hold almost similar physical components, at least in their initial phases, while they differ in the soft components and users' actions within and upon the space (see Figure XXII). In a particular geopolitical context, the progression of the camps' physical and soft components, their dwellers and the policies of the operators are the main determinants of these sites' future.

In their early stages of establishment, refugee camps in Iraq took on an air of permanency. With the blessing and the support of the Kurdistan Regional Government, many NGOs provided materials and cash

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56 These clusters serve as coordination mechanisms and a platform to support multilateral agencies' different field interventions.

Figure XXII: Kawergwesk Refugee Camp fixed grid and the use of brick in upgrading the refugee dwelling units. Also, UNHCR logos are spread in the scene. Beyond the camp lies Kawergwesk, also a former collective town. Source: Author, 2018.

for refugees to upgrade their camp shelters following the guidelines of the camp's management: mainly building within the plot and having a temporary roof, which could be either corrugated sheets or sandwich panels. By the end of 2014, most camps had improved shelters. Each camp had a transit area for new arrivals to be cleared out and replanned later. Refugees with access to sufficient capital upgraded their own shelters, transforming them into more appropriate dwellings.

Different projects were designed to upgrade the spatial living conditions within the camps so that they could be transformed into settlements integrated with the host community. The operators' development approach started to materialize with the acceleration of this transformation. The transformation includes physical component upgrades, such as shelters, public services buildings, roads, sewage networks, electricity, street

lights; and retailoring the soft components to enable self-resilience: for example, skills upgrades, language courses, mental health support, and women empowerment. As such, these upgrades support livelihood generating opportunities attached to the locality of the camp to serve the refugees and host communities.

5.2.2.1. The Upgraded Shelter

In 2015, the United Nations refugee agency initiated the "tent-free camp" campaign with Peace Winds Japan as the leading implementation partner. The effort was funded by the United States Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and approved by the Kurdistan Regional Government. The primary goal of the self-building[57] project is to "ensure that refugees live in more durable, semi-permanent shelters" (PWJ, 2019). The

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57 The self-building project in Erbil camps started by providing orientation sessions to the process, standardized shelter layout, bills of quantity, and labourer payments (phased on eight stages). While the participation component includes informing sessions and focus group discussions with beneficiaries, it intersects with the livelihood one by adding incoming-generating opportunities for refugees (PWJ, 2019).

semi-permanent shelter – rather than the labelled the upgraded shelter – became the paradigm used, and almost upgraded shelters in all refugee camps. The upgraded shelter has the same plot size as the early layouts; it consists of two rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom and a toilet with an internal courtyard. Using brick walls, sandwich panel roofs and standardized windows and doors, these units also have connections to electricity and sewage network and water tanks (see Figures XXIII and XXIV). Refugees get materials, cash to build or hire a builder and technical guidance and support. Any extra additions need approval from the camp management and are funded by the refugees themselves. According to interviewees, many refugees desire to live in the camp, rent-free, closer to families and to start their married lives in the camp; hence the built unit becomes a commodity worth the investment.

Figure XXIII: The upgraded shelter in implantation by PWJ.
The images show the process of provision and self-built.
Source: PWJ, 2019.

Figure XXIV: The upgraded shelter layout.
This model used in refugee camps in the Kurdistan Region since 2015. The image is the application of the
typology in Domiz Refugee Camp in Duhok Governorate.
Source: Image by the Author (2018) and schemes courtesy UNHCR Iraq (2019).

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5.2.2.2. Economic Activities

Many refugees had more entrepreneurial-oriented ideas for their dwelling units. Based on the unit location, opening a room towards the public space could be used as a shop to generate income (see Figure XXV). Hence, having a free shelter, aided for basic needs, socioeconomic support by in- and out-camp networks, access to employment and accumulation of small capital through work, the camp, for many refugees, became a concentration of opportunities. The refugee camps in Kurdistan have their market street, cafes, food delivery, grocery stores, pharmacies and many other businesses to serve everyday needs and generate employment. In addition, many of the camp dwellers are employed by NGOs or working in nearby urban centres.

Figure XXV: Grocery shop in Questhapa Camp.
The image shows the adjustment of part of the dwelling into a shop and the extension using provisional materials to abide with camp regulations.
Source: Author, 2018.

5.2.2.3. Steps Towards Integration

The presence of camps has created socioeconomic flows between refugee camps and urban centres. Having similar ethnicities has encouraged intermarriages and catalysed a hospitable atmosphere with the hosts. Moreover, this presence also created jobs opportunities for the local communities. Many international NGOs hire locals and work closely with local NGOs; hence they perceive the camp as work loci. In addition, the private sector benefits from the camp presence: partnering with camp entrepreneurs, being delegated the public works projects in camps, and importing goods for camps.

In addition, UNHCR has been employing area-based projects to support local and host communities.

These projects include constructing and upgrading services in nearby towns to serve the fragile host and encourage integration. Interestingly, most of these towns are former collective towns built in the 1980s. In Basrima town (see Figure XXVI), the health centre is open to serve refugees, while in Kawergwesk town a community centre and hospital are to be built in 2022 to serve both populations.

This enablement policy plays a significant role in creating synergies between operators and dwellers to facilitate everyday life and stabilize as well as deepen the roots although displaced. The near-future goal is to "Proceed to continuous integration of camp services into national and municipal service provision scheme with the aim to sustainable service provision" (UNHCR, 2020e).

Basirma Collective Town

Basirma Refugee Camp

Figure XXVI: Basirma Refugee Camp and town in Erbil Governorate (a former collective town).
Notice the buffer between the camp and the town, the size of the camp and its density compared to the town.
Source: Author (2021), Based on wego.here maps.

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5.2.3. Chronic Emergency: IDP Camps

In the emergency phase, camps for IDPs and refugees were conceived for the provision of humanitarian service and to focus on survival needs. Nevertheless, contrary to refugee situations, IDPs are expected to return to their original homes (UNHCR, 2018).

As the emergency became prolonged, it uncovered the plausible scenarios for the progression of these camps, mainly depending on the international humanitarian regime and host government's policies concerning the occupational groups. The freedom given to Syrian refugees was not matched for IDPs: "A condition of vulnerability is aided by perceptions of mistrust among communities in a context where inter-community interactions are limited" (Costantini and O'Driscoll, 2020). The environment was more constrained for IDPs; the announced suspicion is related to the ISIS members, especially those lacking documentation. As a result, the majority face severe restrictions of movement and access to facilities outside the camp boundaries (UNHCR, 2020e). Moreover, mistrust and the recent violent history between ethnicities

and the subethnic groups deepened in the built environment. The camps are not progressing beyond the stage of improved shelters (see Figure XXVII). The situation has worsened due to a reduction in funding and prolonged protraction. Despite the local humanitarian regime efforts to meet basic needs, spatial interventions are improvised attempts to make do, reasserting the waiting character of the camp and limiting the IDPs' opportunities to any long-term form of integration.

Iinternally displaced persons still wallow in the no-return mode. Humanitarian funding has declined, their former habitat is severely damaged, obstructing IDPs' repatriation (UNHCR, 2020e). As for camps, many are being decommissioned in the other parts of Iraq, and some are already empty in Kurdistan (see Figure XXVIII). The remaining IDPs are being relocated to other camps, and the rest will be closed in the near future. Nevertheless, through interviews with field workers in IDP camps,[58] many have reported that in-camp migrations are still occurring. The IDPs returned after repatriation, rendering camps as safe havens compared to the insecurities lying outside their boundaries (UNHCR, 2020e).

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58 Interviews with aid workers in Bahrka IDP camp in 2018 and Qayyarah Jad'ah Camp in 2020.

Figure XXVII: Ashti IDP camp showing the improved shelter setting with the brick-built utilities, patched up fabrics of improvised spatial practices.
The iron-grid layout demarcated by the lamp posts. The roads are still dirt.
Source: Author, 2018.

Figure XXVIII: Qayyarah Jad'ah IDP camps, one of four sites which were closed and tents removed.
The layout shows the iron-grid Camp 5, with the layout of single block of 50 tents with shared communal
latrines and distribution points.
Source: Map by (REACH, CCCM, and UNHCR, 2020).

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5.2.4. Impacts of Protracted Displacements in Iraqi Kurdistan

The war on ISIS, the influx of Syrian and Iraqi forcibly displaced groups, and the ongoing fiscal crisis has dramatically impacted the region. The entire magnitude of the compiling crises is still uncertain. A World Bank (2015) report[59] highlighted the impacts of more than 1.5 million refugees and IDPs in the region: poverty has more than doubled, health and living standards are getting worse, basic needs[60] are largely unmet for the displaced and the host communities. There is emanant stress on the inherited fragile infrastructures, including water, sanitation, electricity and solid waste management. Moreover, there has been an increase in demand for food, education and health facilities. These impacts have resulted in socioeconomic and ecological degradation, which is causing "unsustainable strains causing long-term distortions", as the capacity of the international humanitarian regime and the Kurdistan Regional Government is at their limit. Though the situations for camp refugees and IDPs are better than expected,[61] the gaps between needs and provision are beyond bridging. After the conflict with ISIS in 2017, the international humanitarian response aimed to move away from emergencies and towards recovery and reconstruction (UNHCR, 2020e). However, with the decline of humanitarian funding, the fragile and severely damaged built environment and the resurfacing crises pushed sustainable solutions for IDP return and refugees' self-resilience beyond reach.

5.2.4.1. Political Unrest and the Ongoing Covid-19 Crises

Since September 2017, a succession of political instabilities has resurfaced across Iraq. For the Kurdistan Region, the Iraqi Government's measures against what it described as the "unconstitutional results" of an independence referendum added to the latent tension with the Kurdistan Regional Government. These measures included freezing the budget, threatening military action, spreading military control over the disputed areas, and banning international flights to the region. These sanctions also came from across the borders of Iran and Turkey, which lasted till Mid-2018. As Iraqi Kurdistan was cut off from such significant economic flows, adding to the aftermath of the severe decline of import

and export trade due to the ISIS war, the Kurdistan Region's mirage of prosperity evaporated.

Later in 2019, uprisings broke out all over Iraq. Protestors were demanding political and governmental reforms (UNHCR, 2020e). This added to the existing economic crises. Another wave of Syrian refugees crossed the border in need of assistance, and was accommodated in Bardarsh Camp (a former IDP Camp). Conflicts between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê) and the Turkish military have escalated to attacks on the northern borders of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, creating temporary displacements (Al Jazeera, 2020). The closure of IDP camps in southern and central Iraq is sending signs of more significant problems in 2020 (BBC, 2020). Recent reports by the UNHCR and the Kurdistan Regional Government indicate the intention to expand the camps, as refugees asked to be relocated because they are barely able to cope (UNHCR, 2020b, 2020c).

Since April 2020, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has unmasked different vulnerabilities, exemplified inequalities, and triggered another economic crisis, including oil prices droppings, increased need for food rations (UNHCR, 2020b), and inconsistency in livelihood income generation activities (if existed) due to unavoidable multiple lockdowns (Durable Solutions Platform, 2020; UNHCR, 2020a) and as the locked was enforced for the safety of all, added phycological and socioeconomic strains to camp dwellers. These escalations and instabilities dramatically impact situations in the planned sites, as they are dependent entirely on the governmental and humanitarian capacities to provide aid.

With the scarcity of solutions at hand, and weakness of political framework that enables effective operations, UNHCR has announced its work for 2020. Work will continue to maintain its focus on the continued scale of emergency and focusing on urgent programmes, and partner up with development actors in joint programmes (UNHCR, 2020a, 2020e). Such announcements, however, brings back the question of sustainability and self-reliance within these arrival sites.

Section 5 has explored the camps and settlements used in the Kurdistan Region as the apparatus to accommodate

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59 Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Assessing the Economic and Social Impact of the Syrian Conflict and ISIS.

60 Basic needs in the same report include: food, water, fuel, transport, clothing, hygiene items, health care, education and rent.

61 As the camp's existing services have reduced the pressure on the ones in the urban centres, especially in terms of health (primary health clinics and education (schools). The general layout for parallel urban structures in camps is usually caravans ordered to match the need (administration, school, community centres, health centre, …)

waves of forced displacement since 2012. It briefly examined the triggers of these waves, namely the Syrian conflict and the war on ISIS. Then, it described the ways in which the camps were conceived in the emergency phase using the gridded layout of communities and how the prolonged emergency led to the use of the improved shelter as essential shelter provision. Later, the section examined the spatial progression for refugee and IDP camps. For the refugee camps, with Syrian Kurds being the occupational group, the transformation into settlements is in progress, substituting tents with upgraded semi-permanent shelters and supporting the enhancement of the infrastructure.

This transformation extends to support the spatial needs of the fragile host community and seem to encourage socioeconomic flows between the open camps and their surroundings. However, the IDP camps are temporary, with occupants waiting to be evicted in the near-future, regardless of the improbability of effective repatriation. In the end, the section highlighted that despite the efforts within the camps and settlements, the situation is still problematic. Being situated in such a heated geopolitical context, the latent fragilities from previous historical events, the cascade of crises resurfacing and intensifying, dependency on aid is inescapable. At the same time the components of development reinserted within the camp and settlement components lack the nurturing milieu to achieve its aspirations, and leaving these spaces and their users in a crippling situation.

In the last section, this research highlights the inconsistencies in understanding sustainably in chronic conflict zones such as the Kurdistan Region. The focus is to explore the issues linked to setting up camp and settlements in such fragile contexts, and through general recommendations, shift to processes, interdependencies, and capture the possibilities these spatial settings provide.

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6.1. Camps, Settlements as Receiving Sites

6.1.1. Camp, Settlement Paradigms After the Second World War

In Section 3 the research focused on the linkages of humanitarian and development responses to paradigms of camp and settlements in the Global South. The emergency and chronic conflict's sequential relation and the impacts of their presence on different responses, rationales and implementation were clarified. Between the mid-1960s and 1970s, camps served temporary and prolonged displacements while organized settlements were to integrate refugees and develop the unserved areas and populations. Both focused on community, socioeconomics and incorporated development components. However, with ever-shifting policies towards their occupants, whether refugees or IDPs, these paradigms were reduced gradually to becoming a mere grid of sheltering units and basic services. Although many policies now call for well-being and sustainable solutions, forcibly displaced camp layouts were hardly developed; communities became rows of shelters, thereby losing the commune, while the possibilities of integrating refugee settlements and potential prosperities were tied to the political climate.

6.1.2. Particularity of Kurdistan Region as a Chronic Conflict Zone

Sections 4 and 5 briefly traced the triggers for waves of forced displacement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq before the autonomy agreement in the 1970s until 2021. This tracing revealed the ways in which this Region is situated in a heated political climate portraying a chronic conflict zone, and a territory where its urban landscapes are in constant reconfigurations of in-out forced displacements. Born out of chaos and needing a fast deployable solution to "manage and provide", camps and settlements planned anew were indeed the top-down "ideal" tools to deal with the forced displacement in Kurdistan. Based on the geopolitical and expected duration, these sites held almost similar physical components, at least in their initial phases, while they differed in the soft component and the user. The interaction between its components (the hard and the soft) activated by the site users (operators and dwellers) has been the primary determinant of the spatial progression.

Examination of Iraq's historical events and socio-spatial endeavours of development, confinement,

relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation and humanitarian models, and chronic conflict shows that the situation seems to hinder chances of any long-term visions of reconstruction, rehabilitation or integration. Such attributes result in war-exhausted and conflict-ridden socioeconomics, physical infrastructure and aid-dependent populations. The situation for the components of sites and host contexts is in continuous and incremental degradation.

6.1.2.1. Safe Havens and Interdependencies of Opportunities

In the Kurdistan Region, many forced displacement receiving sites find roots in the exhausted, conflict-ridden contexts. Acknowledging this historical lesson, the authors of current policies regarding these sites seem to incorporate a hybrid form of former camp and settlement paradigms. With the grided layout, provisional infrastructure, and self-built forms, these paradigms seem to act like John Turner's sites and services logic (Turner and Fichter, 1972). The flexibility of the grid, the explicit relief and the implicit development logic eased the response in the emergency phase of sheltering and covering survival needs. With the presence of humanitarian support and the concentration of opportunities, especially in the initial phases, these sites act as magnets for many forcibly displaced groups.

Spatial and users' agencies act in tandem to activate the conceived spaces for humanitarian service within the limitations of the political climate. On the one hand, in temporary camps, the local humanitarian response focuses on providing basic needs and short-term ad hoc spatial interventions, where the dwellers are perceived as the recipients of aid who adjust their spaces to fit the probabilities to repatriate. On the other hand, for semi-permanent and permanent camps, the local humanitarian response has longer-term visions of physical upgrades and integration with the host, where the dwellers become a component to be incorporated in the upgrade project (participation, employment, investment) and march towards self-dependency. They appropriate their places to fit possibilities to stay.

Moreover, such humanitarian operations and projects also stimulate various economic opportunities for the host communities. These opportunities include international NGOs hiring local staff or partnering with local ones, contracting labour for service and providing bids for various commodities. With prolonged displacement, mid-size communities and

large public works projects aim, generally, to serve both populations.

6.1.2.2. Regenerated Problems?

According to World Bank (2015), these humanitarian camps in Kurdistan cost hundreds of millions of United States dollars between installation, operation and stabilization. This is in addition to the unprecedented pressure on the region's fragile infrastructures; with an irrevocable ecological impact that is affecting the land, surface water and livelihoods for the historically vulnerable region (World Bank, 2015). In all future scenarios, contrary to what the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies says of the possibilities to "ensure the site is returned to its previous condition" (UNHCR, 2020f), in such complex situations, relying on humanitarian responses is inescapable, producing aid-dependent territories and communities. At the same time, the impact on the land and the ecological system is irreversible.

Whether short or long lifespan, planned or not, these camps and settlements still impose, just like any habitat, pressure on natural resources and livelihoods opportunities, while their infrastructure still fall short in terms of service provision with the gradual retractions of funding (Grafham and Lahn, 2018). In chronic conflict zones, the funding retraction is also linked with the need to work with other refugee crises and help other group repatriations (Crisp, 2003). Moreover, the nature of the provision leading consumption-based practices barely considers the sustainability models beyond mitigation. Despite their attempts, the camp operators' linear spatial provision policies and the forcibly displaced habits of endurance seem to go into a vacuum.

In the absence of a continuous presence of a nurturing milieu, with such fragilities and threats, the aspiration to link relief and development to achieve sustainability and resilience that neglects the frequency of these interruptions is improbable. Equally, seeding camps and settlements in such crippling situations will only produce similar urban forms and human conditions in endless need of a boost.

6.2. The Myth of Sustainability in Contemporary Refugee Situations

Planning to sustain is not a new concept; it has been the centre of urban planning academia and practices for decades. The particularity of forced displacement and the promotion of self-sustaining displacement

sites dates to the earliest designs of cities of refuge to post-wars mass housing projects, significantly accelerated after the First World War and intensified after the Second World War (Lewis, 2016). However, changing the refugee and IDP figures from victims of circumstances into a temporary political presence challenges application of these sustainability concepts to move beyond green-washing foils. As examined in section 3.2, these definitions dramatically impacted characters of the built environment that host the displaced populations, reverting to temporariness and shying away from any promises of permanency. Being situated in chronic conflict zones, naturally, the humanitarian response cannot ignore basic human needs, hindering possibilities of sustainability purposes that the displacement site is supposed to uphold.

6.2.1. Failing to Sustain

The international humanitarian regime has been advocating sustainable approaches and durable solutions for the forcibly displaced groups to align with the Sustainable Development Goals (UNHCR, 2016b, 2016c). In 2018, the Global Compact on Refugees emphasized the need to ease pressure on the host countries and enhance refugees' self-reliance (United Nations, 2018).

This future-oriented thinking has invited many initiatives to apply, develop, and tailor sustainable solutions in these camps and settlements (UNHCR, 2014, 2016c). These practices range from reusing old caravans to developing more durable dwelling typologies, to facing harsh winters on the dwelling unit level. Moreover, at the infrastructural level, they aim to follow a more conscious approach to include solar panels, wastewater separation (black and grey), small to medium scale decentralized wastewater treatment systems and reuse water for small-sized agricultural activities. At the same time, the programmes are working on adjusting these sites by providing capacity-building and skills upgrades. The aim is that the forcibly displaced reach resilience and self-sufficiency such that the humanitarian mission can phase out.

However, in chronic conflict zones, these attempts still lack a feasible milieu for effective activation, feasible markets and profitable employment to accumulate means for a safe return or a viable integration. Despite the efforts of different ad hoc projects, these solutions did not bypass the temporary time-space boundaries, acting as a low-quality bandage on an inflammatory

problem. As such, all factors combined, the existing solutions mismatch the unstable contexts, hinder any effective progress and treat sustainability as mere end products. As long as humanitarian and development approaches in such regions are locked in linear processes and rely on fragile settings, the existing problems are expected to resurge and multiply for the displaced and host population and threaten the local ecological system at large.

6.2.2. Circularity: A Corrective Move?

Circularity, as an approach to "rethink from the ground" (OECD, 2020), has been portrayed as a practical correction move to the misuse of natural resources and drastic effects feeding the global climate crisis (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2019). By promising to make amends to "overcome the contradiction between economic and environmental prosperity" (Pomponi and Moncaster, 2017), the circular economy is rising to the stage as an inclusive concept that promotes "a well-being vision of tomorrow". The circular economy aligns economic flourishment with the sustainable development goals "where no one is left behind" (see Figure XXIX). This alignment has also been the central part of the engagement policy and commitments to the Goals and the 2030 Agenda announced by UNHCR (2019a) through developing strategic guidance to UNHCR field operations that aspires for inclusivity[62] (UNHCR, 2019b).

Circular thinking starts by looking and acting into the present as a proactive rather than a preventative measure. It marches to rebalance resource scarcities and ecological impacts while revitalizing local and regional economies (Calisto Friant, Vermeulen and Salomone, 2020). Rising scholarly studies embarked on exploring circularity in the built environments proposing frameworks in designing with (urban

and material) flows and resources management (Athanassiadis, 2017; Marin and De Meulder, 2018; Pomponi and Moncaster, 2017; Williams, 2019). By bringing urbanism to the circularity table, Marin and De Meulder (2018), for example, suggest that the urban landscape design discipline has the capacity to work with place; specifies and tap on concealed multi-scaler transition relations to become drivers for circular thinking.

For circular models to function and be attained, Calisto Friant et al. (2020) proposed the "circular society" term, accentuating the importance of societal dynamics in realistic visions of circularity. Hence, including societal aspects within resources' sustainable loops of "wealth, knowledge, technology and power [...] circulated and redistributed throughout society" (Pomponi and Moncaster, 2017) through circular behaviours oriented towards value retention options[63] (Reike et al., 2018).

Planned displacement camps and settlements are, by nature, designed as reduced forms of urbanity to support basic needs. Through cuts and reductions of physical, operative and consumption patterns to a minimum standard of prolonged "right-now" solutions, the users aim to keep these lifesaving machines operative (Boano, Matén and Sierra, 2018; Genel, 2006). However, these sites share with cities being places where users live, consume, dispose and work (international, local, and displaced). Through our historical review of the interaction between the contextual conditions, political climate, meanings, and the spatial progression of such receiving sites, one main fact remains the same:

the modular site's adaptive capacity to be calibrated and act as an enabler. This fact manifests on different scales of these adjustments and uses vary: everything flows to the camp, keeps finding ways to embody a physicality.

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62 The guidance note includes advocating and supporting different goals that ensure "adequate access for housing, basic services, equitable sanitation, clean water, clean energy, and economic growth" in order to include the vulnerable groups and reduce inequalities and aiming to reach inclusive, sustainable cities and communities (UNHCR, 2019a, 2019b).

63 Refuse (R0), Reduce(R1), Re-sell/Reuse (R2), Repair (R3), Refurbish (R4), Re-manufacture (R5), Re-purpose/Rethink (R6), Re-cycle (R7), Recover (R8), Re-mine (R9) (Reike, Vermeulen and Witjes, 2018).

Figure XXIX: UNEP circularity approach: the circular economy processes.
Source: United Nations Environment Programme (2019), UNEP circularity platform. www.unenvironment.org/circularity.

6.2.3. The Forcibly Displaced Endurance Practices

Different ad hoc practices of various international and local NGOs take place in these sites to make life bearable, serve the displaced, and enable them to support themselves. The scarcity of these provisions, retraction of aid, or existence of different forms of capital and networks push the forcibly displaced groups to take charge and readjust their spaces (Bshara, 2014). Value retention is embedded and developed within the dwellers' strategies and habits to endure and cope. Endurance practices include reducing waste and, if possible, maximizing gains by carefully examining and exhausting most items before becoming disposable waste. Everything can be repaired, refurbished, reused and repurposed: in the Domiz Camp, the deteriorated tent fabrics become temporary roof isolations, corrugated sheets become additional internal spatial divisions or are used to demark spaces for communal

and commercial activities. Donated clothes are reused and upcycled, and second-hand applications get refurbished and are sold in the camp's market. The dynamics and presence of these endurance practices relate primarily to spatial and material flows, and with the presence of aid, fills the missing gaps and create foundations for a circular society.

Zooming out and exploring larger geographical scales, many cases have accentuated the use of vacant existing structures as opportunities. The mining of remaining materials from destroyed villages to build new shelters in Sumud (4.1.4), recovering power plants in Zakho (4.2.2), reusing Rizgary town vacant structures (4.3.2), and recycling the closed Bardarash IDP camp to accommodate refugees and IDPs waves (5.2.4); these practices seem to fall in the right direction to prioritize a contextual based circular approach (Lacovidou and Purnell, 2016).

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6.3. Towards a Self-Sustaining Paradigm: New Camps, Settlements in Chronic Conflict Areas

Though thinking of camps and settlements as isolated locales is problematic, it would be interesting to think of their infrastructures as such. Thinking of new camps and settlements as loci of infrastructure can present an opportunity to tailor such understandings or circularity. The optimized design, scale and semi-isolation of these sites can be seen as an opportunity to apply such circular "systematic shift" thinking to slow down, narrow and close consumption loops to become independent sites. Earlier models of camps and organized settlements in the 1960 and 1970s highlighted such possibilities (section 3.2.2). The idea is to incorporate decentralized infrastructural solutions retrofitted on multiple scales (communities, blocks, sectors and villages, camps and settlements). This would enable fast responses and flexible prototypes of components for the emergency phases to be upgraded and scaled up, while considering the possibilities for design for assembly and disassembly[64] (Rios, Chong and Grau, 2015). Furthermore, it is paramount to assess and investigate the needs of complementary structures to ensure that designing out does not leave the residual waste untreated on a larger scale (recycling, faecal sludge treatment, wastewater treatment[65]). These complementary structures serve the displaced and the host. This thinking can shine new light to the possibilities of maintaining enormous humanitarian expenditure to set up and run these sites and recirculate the values within its spaces and amongst its users.

More focused research is required to understand the role of camps and settlements within chronic conflict situations. The need is to grasp the reality of the ways in which emergency and relative stabilities structure a modified time-space, and fragmented existences materialized. In combination with intensive research for tailored solutions, the practical knowledge of camps and settlements field operators and dwellers can feed the understanding of possibilities within limitations. This know-how will feed into developing paradigms that incorporate circular concepts for such sites to become self-sustaining settlements.

6.4. Key Recommendations

This research aimed to understand the role of planning for forced displacement in chronic conflict zones. Through the understanding of the meaning of chronic conflict and the localities and interruptions of stabilities; the examination of the historical progression of spatial paradigms developed for the forcibly displaced since the Second World War; the lessons learnt from the particularity of forced displacement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq; and briefly examining circularity to achieve the balance between sustainability and economic flourishment, the recommendations are as follows:

- It is essential to analyse chronic conflict in terms of time and space: identify the relative stable territorial pockets and the rhythms of emergencies. This analysis will support designing spatial configurations that suit the displacements, temporality, relief and development responses. Many situations today fit in such descriptions as Afghanistan, Sudan, Syria, Yemen etc.

- Within the reality of unexpected flows of displaced persons in such heated zones, there is a need to rethink temporary and fixed in terms of spaces and occupational groups. Groups can be hosted in fixed transit spaces to act as spaces for temporary waiting (several days to few months). These spaces can help support the efforts of the humanitarian workers and local governments to respond fast to displacement with minimum pressure on the structures of host communities.

- In many cases, the presence of the forcibly displaced in camps and settlements generates opportunities for the forcibly displaced and host communities. Hence, there is a need for further research on the ways in which such opportunities can self-regenerate with the retraction of funding to support self-reliance and expand to potentials of financial improvements. These improvements support the safe return as well as practical integration.

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64 By definition, design for disassembly is the design of buildings to facilitate future changes and dismantlement (in part or whole) for recovery of systems, components and materials, thus ensuring the building can be recycled as efficiently as possible at the end of its lifespan. The strategy builds on an increasing acknowledgement of the fact that the majority of the built environment has a limited lifespan and that every building represents a depository of resources, which, rather than ending up in a landfill, should find their way back into the "reduce, reuse, recycle" loop (Cutieru, 2020).

65 Several innovative solutions and ideas are already emerging in applied research and practice within this frame of thinking. For example, BORDA (the Bremen Overseas Research and Development Association) has been developing septic bags designed for emergencies to treat wastewater for safe disposal. These bags can be replaced and scaled up to reuse the wastewater treated for agricultural purposes (BORDA, 2018). Similarly, solar farms set to reduce the use of fuel to run camps: Zaatari Camp has a solar farm to supply the camp with power (UNHCR, 2019a). By scaling down the panels' use on a refugee dwelling and community level could also save costs of the maintenance for large solar farms and reduce consumption on a domestic level, electricity costs and carbon dioxide emissions of generators (Leach, 2015).

- Incorporate decentralized solutions to work on camp and settlement levels that can be enlarged with complementary structures to become enablers and support the healing of the fragile contexts.

- Thinking of possibilities within the limitations. Different practices of the forcibly displaced emerge within their situations' conditionalities; hence they develop know-how through spatial practices to readjust spaces on their perception of need and socioeconomic and spatial habits of endurance. Further research is needed to map and understand these habits to be employed in humanitarian and development responses.

- Sustainability in chronic conflict can hardly be achieved as a linear process. It is paramount to rethink the meaning beyond service or end product. Further research is needed to investigate and test how the process of sustainability can be retrofitted

on the time-space structures of sudden shocks, prolonged crises and relative stabilities.

- It is recommended that Cuny's concepts be revisited and to tailor them to become paradigms of self-sustaining camps and settlements incorporating and testing circular thinking to achieve self-regenerating economies.

- It would be interesting to rethink the closed arrival infrastructures as potential sites to be recycled and repurposed later for different uses in contexts similar to that of the Kurdistan Region. Hence, it is recommended to set up the infrastructure with the aim of reactivation.

- Further research is needed to develop new paradigms of camps and settlements adopting the circular thinking of closing the short loops of value retention, consumption and waste on communities, blocks and camp scales.

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